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Introduction
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Contemporary Indian politics revolves around the unique, singular importance of Prime
Minister Narendra Modi, who has been Prime Minister since his landslide elections in 2014 and
2019. Not since Indira Gandhi has a political figure so dominated the Indian political scene, and
he has overseen deep changes to norms of Indian democracy. Compared to the previous era of
Indian democracy that was more decentralized, coalition-based, and that had relatively weak
Prime Ministers, India is now in an era of an increasingly centralized, single-party government
with a strong Prime Minister. This transformation has caused deep changes to the nature of
contemporary Indian democracy, and examining the nature of Modi’s government and electoral
success is a vital question any scholar of Indian studies has to deal with. This question is
especially interesting in looking at contemporary limitations of Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party
and how the rise of the BJP has been challenged in three key states from 2019-2021:
Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu, and West Bengal. The nature of this opposition, and whether the
Indian National Congress or opposition state parties are more capable of successfully opposing
the BJP, is an enduring contemporary question of Indian democracy.
The answer in many ways defines Indian democracy, as whether a national party,
associated with New Delhi and the central government, and centripetal forces of Indian
democracy can offer a challenge to the BJP, or if state parties, representing the decentralizing,
centrifugal forces of Indian democracy, are better situated to successfully challenge the BJP. This
paper hopes to examine this question, and look at elections since 2019 in Maharashtra, Tamil
Nadu, and West Bengal in order to understand why the BJP has faced defeats in each state, and
why state parties have been the primary vehicle for these defeats. What this means for the 2022
Uttar Pradesh election will also be examined, and whether the theories presented in this paper
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explain the outcome in that state will be a test of the paper’s limits or broader viability. The
answers to these questions are essential to understanding the future of Indian democracy, and
whether India is approaching another era of hegemonic party-rule a la India under the Indian
National Congress from 1947-77, or if the contemporary dominance of Modi is more temporary.
Additionally, the nature of the Indian National Congress and state parties discussed will be a key
locus of analysis, as the recent crises affecting the INC leadership, combined with a sense that
the party needs a renewal, compared to state parties that are more dynamic and focused, will be
examined.
This paper attempts to explain the contemporary challenges of BJP failure in the cases
selected by highlighting 3 points. First, that state parties in the cases are the best vector of
resistance to the BJP due to their more dynamic and competent leadership compared to a
moribund INC leadership. This dynamism comes from the fact many of these parties fit into two
broad camps. One is those led by ex-INC figures, who were the most talented and charismatic
members of the INC in their respective states, who then left the INC due to the crisis of
leadership the INC is facing since the 1990s. The other are more purely regional political parties
that began to compete in elections against the INC and so developed outside and in opposition to
an originally hegemonic INC. The two models of state parties means that the parties, led by
rational political entrepreneurs, need to find an electoral niche for themselves originally in
opposition to a party that dominated the state. This meant the state political entrepreneurs in
question early on needed to find a more focused social base and ideological formation for their
parties in order to have continued relevance, and this greater coherence has made them more
capable of opposing the BJP in their respective states. Secondly, strong regional identity in each
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state creates an extra layer of resistance to Hindu Nationalism, with state parties linked to that
regional identity able to be a much more effective vector of resistance than the INC, which lacks
this localist identity. This link means the state parties are better able to form alliances with other
political actors within their state and connect with voters, as it creates another level of identity
that goes beyond simple Hindu-secular dichotomy that the BJP and INC mobilize off of. Thirdly,
the ongoing agricultural crisis in India means that there is a large constituency of voters prone to
blame incumbent governments for lack of support. The agrarian nature of India, with a huge rural
constituency in almost every Indian state, means that rural concerns are hugely electorally
significant. State parties, which depend on their state constituencies to remain relevant and thus
are more capable of mobilizing this anger, are thus able to use farmer unrest to provide a viable
electoral wedge against the BJP. These three forces, this paper argues, create systemic
vulnerabilities for the BJP in each of the cases, and going forward will be a key limitation on
continued BJP dominance across India. Within the traditional BJP base of the Hindi Belt, the
recent state election in Uttar Pradesh in March 2022 will be examined in the conclusion to see
how the state functions under this tripartite frame of reference.
Indian democracy is at an extremely critical and fascinating moment. The prospects of
the 2024 general election are extremely far away, but the trends discussed in this paper will have
clear impacts across Indian politics as the Indian opposition decides its electoral strategy leading
to 2024. Regardless of the future outcomes, each case in this study is fascinating and deserving
of research in its own right, and contemporary Indian electoral politics deserves further study.
While not discussed in this paper, the nature of contemporary Dalit and Muslim politics will also
be an important topic of future research as both are a key constituency that is traditionally hostile
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to the BJP and thus a potential vector of resistance for the state parties discussed in this paper
going forward. Additionally, the nature of youth and female voting patterns, two extremely key
bases of BJP support, are not discussed in this paper and so are worthy of continued study in
each case study. It is an extremely important moment to study Indian politics and South Asia’s
electoral politics more broadly, and this paper will be an important addition to the academic
literature on this topic.
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Background
Era of INC Dominance 1947-1989
This first period of Indian democracy lasted from Indian independence in 1947 until the
defeat of the INC under Rajiv Gandhi in the 1989 election. During this period, the Indian
National Congress ruled India almost uninterrupted, first under Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru
(1947-1964), then Lal Bahadur Shastri (1964-66), then Nehru’s daughter Indira Gandhi
(1966-1977, 1980-1984) and then her son Rajiv Gandhi (1984-1989). Though the party never
won a majority of the national vote, the party was the single-largest party in India and in the firstpast-the-post, single member district electoral system utterly dominated the legislature. The
leaders of the INC, especially under Nehru and Indira Gandhi, defined the country as a secular
country accepting of religious and linguistic minorities. The party used the legitimacy and
organization it had achieved in the struggle for Indian independence to dominate the country
organizationally, creating a dominant party system where patronage and co-opting of social
movements meant the INC remained the single most dominant party in the country.1 This period
saw the extreme marginalization of anti-INC or non-Congress political entrepreneurs from
1947-1957. However, as the 1960s wore on, the party began facing challenges to its dominance.
The INC did not lose this dominance for any one reason, but a variety of converging
factors slowly eroded its dominance. The Gandhi dynasty was based in Uttar Pradesh and
Southern India historically was hesitant at best, alienated at worst, at the linguistic policies of the
INC state governments. Linguistic nationalism then developed as local peoples demanded
1James

Manor,“Parties and Politics.” Essay. In India's Democracy: An Analysis of Changing State-Society
Relations, 1st ed., 1:65–66. 1. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1988.

Markel 8

representation for their linguistic population, with local political entrepreneurs mobilizing off an
issue that had obvious salience. This was most defined in Tamil Nadu, which was at the center of
at-times violent struggle for linguistic autonomy. This meant that as the 50s and 60s wore on,
linguistic nationalism developed as a vector of localist resistance to the centralized INC rule
across the entire country. On top of this, left-wing parties and political entrepreneurs, most
notably the Communist Party of India but also Dravidian parties in Tamil Nadu, mobilized
against the INC with a message of social justice, caste abolition, and land reform, which cut into
the cross-class and cross-caste INC coalition. Internal factionalism further upset INC hegemony
as Indira Gandhi launched a campaign against party oligarchs, causing an open civil war which
drove a rift in the party between long-time INC heads and loyalists to Indira.2 This mobilization
of a more non-programmatic populist party under Indira, though electorally successful in the
short term, did deinstitutionalize the party, removed intra-party democracy, and made it more
reliant on Indira and her family. This change, where the party was less able to integrate ambitious
state political entrepreneurs, would further decentralize Indian politics away from INC
hegemony.
The results of this would be a weakening of the INC, even as Indira issued a national
Emergency and ruled as an effective dictator from 1975-1977. This move, which would be
deeply unpopular and resented for upsetting Indian democratic norms, forced a coalition of
opposition forces to form under the Janata Party, which combined ex-INC figures, state parties,
socialists, and Hindu Nationalists, under the direction of Moraji Desai, a long-time INC figure
turned anti-Indira figure. The landslide victory of the Janata Party in 1977 was mitigated as the
2Manor,“Parties

and Politics.” In India’s Democracy, Pages 66-70
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contradictory coalition did not govern coherently, and soon lost power in 1980 to a resurgent
INC under Indira. After the return of the INC in the landslide defeat of the Janata Party in 1980,
Indira took power in a deeply changed country during her second term in office. The country had
become a real multi-party democracy and deeply, confrontationally, democratic, which
destabilized the fragile political equilibrium of social-forces and politics that the prior INC
period represented. Anti-incumbency became a norm throughout the country, and the country
became much more difficult to govern with the rise of multiple conflicting political movements.3
This more diverse political era would be put off by her assassination in 1984, and her son Rajiv
Gandhi riding a wave of sympathy for the 1984 election. He would also be unable to govern
successfully due to his own political fumbling and a destabilizing corruption scandal contributed
to a severe weakening of the INC in 1989,4 which would create a new political era for India and
the true awakening of state political entrepreneurs.
Mandal Era 1989-2014
This era of Indian democracy saw the fragmentation of Indian politics. The period from
1989-1991 saw three different governments and two elections, which was an unprecedented
period of instability. VP Singh, formerly the Finance Minister under Rajiv Gandhi who defected
to a reconstituted Janata Party, was able to form a government that was propped up by the BJP
and Communists, and began implementing the Mandal Report. The Report was a 1979
commission study that supported affirmative action policies for “Other Backward Castes” which

3Manor,“Parties
4Sumit

and Politics.” In India’s Democracy, 71-77

Ganguly and Mukherji Rahul. “Political Mobilization.” Essay. In India since 1980, 1st ed., 122–23. New
York, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011.
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reawakened caste conflicts in India by creating immense demand for entry into lucrative state
jobs. This birthed a new era of political entrepreneurship through caste mobilization, with
numerous OBC parties being birthed to represent this now mobilized constituency, notably the
SP in Uttar Pradesh led by Mulayam Singh Yadav and the mobilization of Dalits under Kanshi
Ram’s BSP.5 This further fragmentation was most obvious in Uttar Pradesh, which saw its
elections fragment in this period between the Samajwadi Party supported by Yadavs and
Muslims, the BSP supported by Dalits, the BJP supported by Brahmins and the urban middle
class, and the rump of the once dominant INC coalition. As a result, Indian politics in this period
was greatly fragmented, making electoral majorities extremely difficult to form and necessitating
fragile minority governments between national parties and cynical state political entrepreneurs.
The 1991 Indian election saw these trends deepen. The INC recovered seats and formed a
minority government under PV Narasimha Rao, who managed to push through an ambitious
series of economic liberalization reforms in order to fix the country’s economic crisis.6 The Rao
government saw the further fragmentation of power in India as Hindu nationalism accelerated as
a political force with the demolition of the Babri Masjid Mosque and the erosion of the party in
states across India. The mobilization of communal religious ties by the Sangh Parivar family,
first by the RSS and then by its political wings that coalesced into the BJP, saw its full expression
as the 80s and 90s developed. Both for ideological reasons of true-hearted Hindu nationalism,
and also the realization that playing on communal ties could be a truly decisive vote-getter as
Hindu nationalism accelerated in the 80s, meant the BJP rapidly grew. This culminated in the
5Ganguly

and Rahul,“Political Mobilization.” In India since 1980, Pages 124-128

6Ganguly

and Rahul,“Political Mobilization.” In India since 1980, Pages 128-130
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1996 Indian election, as the INC continued to splinter and face corruption scandals and faced a
surging BJP under its long-time leader Atal Bihari Vajpayee. India would then have 3 Cabinets
from 1996-1998, and two more elections, in 1998 and 1999, until Vajpayee was finally able to
form a coalition government based on its National Democratic Alliance, an alliance between the
BJP and state allies.7 State parties had been dominant in this period of chaos, as the true volatility
of the situation meant one party could decide the government, as the AIADMK did when it first
supported, then deserted, the 1998 Vajpayee cabinet. The period of government instability ended,
as Vajpayee was able to complete his legislative term, a first for any Federal non-INC
government, creating a new, much more coalition-based, era in Indian politics.
Vajpayee lost re-election in 2004 to a resurgent INC under Sonia Gandhi with Manmohan
Singh as PM, who would go onto win another term in 2009. He did not run for a third term as
Prime Minister and the INC chose instead Sonia and Rajiv Gandhi’s son, Rahul, who was not in
cabinet under Singh and had no national or state experience beyond being in charge of the INC’s
youth and student wings. Though he was young and fresh-faced at 44, he was also the scion of a
dynasty that had dominated India for almost 70 years and had no experience and seemingly little
natural political ability.8 This was compared to his BJP rival, a man who surprised many when he
was chosen as the Prime Minister candidate as he was a long-time state leader of the BJP in
Gujarat, Narendra Modi, who had fully lived through the BJP’s ascent from a marginal extremist
party to a fully legitimate national party.
7Ganguly
8Agence

and Rahul,“Political Mobilization.” In India since 1980, Pages 131

France-Presse. “Election Results 2014: Rahul Gandhi, 'India's Princeling', in Sharp Focus Today.”
NDTV.com. NDTV, First Published May 16, 2014. https://www.ndtv.com/elections-news/election-results-2014rahul-gandhi-indias-princeling-in-sharp-focus-today-562216.
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This era was unique and an innovation over the hegemonic INC era that preceded it
because of the more decentralized nature of Indian politics. Instead of India having a uniquely
centralized Federation, some of that central command was dissipated in return for more power to
state organs. The further liberalization reforms of the 90s further decreased the amount of power
of the central government, especially as state-parties could play against the now two-party
system in India to gain material benefits for their state. National-state alliances were thus made
vital for any government, as not one government from 1989-2014 had a single-party majority.
This developed traditions and power of multi-party coalition building and decentralized
democratic decision-making, which was healthy for the development of Indian democracy.
Throughout this period, from 1947-2014, saw the sliding of the hegemonic INC and political
entrepreneurs finding electoral niches for themselves, developing India into a highly fragmented,
but two-coalition, system. The INC still had advantages over their rivals in the BJP from
1989-2014, however, as the party remained the one truly national Indian party and could still win
power under the right national leadership. By 2014 however, the erosion of INC strength, and
further dominance of the Gandhi dynasty, meant that the party had sapped itself of its strength
and was vulnerable to a competent challenger. That competent challenger would usher in a new
era in Indian politics, one that would severely disrupt the existing balance of power in India and
upset existing state parties who were exploiting this decentralized era.
The Modi Era 2014-Present
The rise of Narendra Modi, the Gujarat BJP Chief Minister best known for presiding over
some of the worst communal riots in Indian history, was long in the making but also unique to
Modi’s appeal as a politician. First, the institutional nature of the BJP allowed it to have a more
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coherent electoral strategy across a wide swath of India, as its tight electoral focus on Hindu
nationalism provided it an early electoral niche that political entrepreneurs could expand off of
through the decades by finding the right caste combination of support, beyond their
predominantly upper-caste, Brahmin original constituency. Outreach to OBC and young voters
by Modi and the BJP into their existing coalition was years in the making and was part of a longterm outreach campaign among the poor. The use of the Sangh Parivar, the family of
organizations broadly under the RSS and Hindu Nationalist umbrella, to provide social welfare
benefits to poorer voters was done to build trust and support for the political branch of the
Hindutva movement, the BJP.9 This was especially clear in areas in North India where the BJP
has had a long history of activism and mobilization, but the party has recently expanded this
strategy across India. Further, the party used aggressive candidate selection to maximize vote
shares in key districts, running Dalit or lower caste candidates as the situation demanded.10 Thus,
Hindu nationalism but also calculated caste and class coalitions has created an electoral
combination that Modi has been uniquely talented at maintaining. This Hindu nationalist appeal
was made even more electoral viable during the 2000s, spurred on by a spate of terrorist attacks,
which helped drive home this rhetoric of Hindu victimization and the need for a aggressive,
muscular Hindu nationalism.11 The dominance of airwaves and media through intense
9Tariq Thachil.

“Why Rich and Poor Voters Support an Elite Party in India.” Essay. In Elite Parties, Poor Voters:
How Social Services Win Votes in India, 1st ed., Page 102. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University
Press, 2014.
10Shanker Arnimesh.

“BJP Rolls out Fleet of OBC, Dalit Leaders as Star Campaigners for 1st Phase of UP Polls.”
ThePrint, Last Modified January 20, 2022. https://theprint.in/politics/bjp-rolls-out-fleet-of-obc-dalit-leaders-as-starcampaigners-for-1st-phase-of-up-polls/807781/.
11Christophe

Jaffrelot. “Modi's Rise to Power, or How to Exploit Hope, Fear, and Anger.” Essay. In Modi's India:
Hindu Nationalism and the Rise of Ethnic Democracy, 1st ed., Pages 75–83. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton
University Press, Published 2021.
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campaigning and unified media programs allowed the BJP to blanket the opposition and further
cement their hegemony over discourse.12 The long-term creation of the Modi coalition was
decades in the making, but saw its full flowering under Modi, a political entrepreneur who had
the means and opportunity to fully express his brand of entrepreneurship that he had honed in his
home-state of Gujarat..
On top of the more institutional reasons Modi won in 2014, he has proved himself to be
the most dominant Indian leader since Indira Gandhi while in government. His exceptional
mobilization of Hindu nationalist sentiment, on a global method of right-wing populist methods
of demonizing his enemies as traitors to the nation, playing up fears of Muslims and Pakistan,
and of attacking the liberal, secular nature of the Indian state. His public persona as a competent,
austere politician striving to make India a great power based on Hindu identity proved extremely
successful.13 The result of all this is that the BJP began racking up a series of state victories in
2014, winning power in Maharashtra, Haryana, Jammu and Kashmir, and Jharkhand. By 2018
the party or its NDA allies had won power across almost all of North India, culminating in an
explosion of vote share and winning a legislative supermajority in the electoral vital state of
Uttar Pradesh in 2017. In the 2019 general election won an even greater share of the popular vote
at over 37% and 21 more seats. The INC only managed to gain 8 seats overall, and Rahul Gandhi
resigned,14 and the party leadership went back to his mother, though the need for reforms within

12Jaffrelot,

“Modi’s Rise to Power” in Modi’s India, pages 95-101

13Jaffrelot,

“Modi’s Rise to Power” in Modi’s India, pages 91-95

14Kai

Schultz, and Kumar Hari. “Rahul Gandhi Resigns as Leader of India's Congress Party.” The New York Times,
Last Modified July 3, 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/03/world/asia/rahul-gandhi-resigns.html.
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the party has provoked huge internal anger, namely the G23 revolt by party grandees against the
Gandhi dynasty.
What this means for this paper is that as the INC declined, political entrepreneurs were
able to mobilize discordant forces and new political communities to oppose the INC. From
within the party through defectors, and from without the party by outside parties, the INC has
seen itself become a sidelined political force, with its energy and brainpower sapped by a
dynasty that has proven deeply resistant to internal reforms. Compared to the BJP, which has
historically been resistant, if not clean, from dynastic politics and with avenues for political
advancement for regional elites, the INC has ossified and stagnated since the 1990s. Thus, the
BJP’s main opposition to its electoral fortunes is not the INC, but regional and state parties who
lack this toxic internal structure.
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Case Selection
The reason for choosing the case selection in this study is due to several parameters that
make them important to the study of modern Indian politics. The three cases chosen for study
were Maharashtra, West Bengal, and Tamil Nadu, as each had several key parameters in question
that made them indicative of Indian political trends. A fourth case, Uttar Pradesh, will be
discussed in the conclusion to test the validity of the trends discussed. Each state has a highly
distinct political history and identity, and each has different social, demographic makeups which
makes them highly distinct from one another. This makes it a most-different case study in order
to “nationalize” the trends discussed in order to understand larger Indian politics. Each state has
common features that make them different, but worthy of discussion in one combined whole.
The states were selected for their large population, as each is in the top 10 most populous
states in the country. Maharashtra is the second most populous state in India, fourth is West
Bengal, and sixth is Tamil Nadu, per Indian census records. This means that the political impact
of each state is extremely important, corresponding to 129 seats in the Lok Sabha.15 This means
that each state is a major electoral prize held by the BJP and thus is a key electoral focus for the
party, which makes them highly worthy of study. Geographically, each state is in a distinct area
of India, in that Tamil Nadu is located in southern India, Maharashtra in central India, and West
Bengal in eastern India. This means that each state is situated in a unique political and cultural
atmosphere than the rest of India, and not clustered in one location in India in order to ensure the
results of this study are not limited by regional over-selection. Secondly, each state has innate
15“States

Census 2011.” List of states with Population, Sex Ratio and Literacy Census 2011. Accessed January 11,
2022. https://www.census2011.co.in/states.php.
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characteristics and unique demographics not found in other states and from each other case,
which highlights the overall trends and forces discussed in this paper. Maharashtra is dominated
by the Maratha caste and speaks the Marathi language, which gives the state a dominant castelinguistic group that is central to the politics of the state and different from Tamil Nadu and West
Bengal.16 Tamil Nadu has a deeply fragmented caste makeup, but a very strong linguistic and
regional identity, on top of being the most urbanized state in India. It is also the most Hindu state
of the three and also a state with the fourth largest number of Dalits in India.17 West Bengal also
has a fragmented caste makeup like Tamil Nadu, and is dominated by the Bangla language and a
strong regional identity, but also has one of the largest Muslim populations in India and also with
the second most Dalits, which combined making up over 45% of the population.18 This
highlights the diverse demography of each state, with each having distinct makeups that mean
one demographic trend in one state would not necessarily play in another state.
For each case, there is little the states have in common beyond their huge political
significance. The Chief Minister of each state automatically becomes one of the most prominent
politicians in India, wielding huge resources and political influence. They have wildly different
political traditions and political arrangements, and distinct social realities. The BJP thus has each
state as a focus beyond its traditional Hindi belt, North India base, and thus makes the study of

16Prachi

Hajare, “Caste Wise Population of Maharashtra.” PSCNOTES.IN, Last Modified July 15, 2021. https://
pscnotes.in/caste-wise-population-of-maharashtra/.
17Akila

Muthukumar, “Casteism and the Making of Modern Tamil Nadu.” Health Righters, Last Modified July 21,
2020. https://healthrighters.com/2020/07/18/lives-lost-to-casteism-in-tamil-nadu/.
18Outlook Web

Desk, “'Bengal Hasn't Produced a Jagjivan Ram or Even a Mayawati'.” Outlook India, Last
Modified February 3, 2022. https://www.outlookindia.com/website/story/bengal-hasnt-produced-a-jagjivan-ram-oreven-a-mayawati/281957.
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BJP expansion into each state hugely important to Indian politics. One of the one commonalities
of each state is that each has seen a contemporary rise of the BJP. The BJP was much less
powerful, or practically nonexistent, in each state before 2014, but after 2014 the BJP has shown
a massive increase in political influence and support. This makes each state extremely clear in
highlighting the changing social realities of the BJP coalition in each state and how that has
impacted the politics of each state, which makes them worthy of being a case.
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Theoretical Framework
Thus, the cases selected are highly competitive and important to understand
contemporary Indian politics, and are vital to understanding opposition politics in India.
The working thesis of this paper rests on several concurrent factors in each of the cases selected
for this study. Before that is discussed, it is important to note the theoretical underpinning of this
study.
This paper is based on an interpretation of political entrepreneurship. Theorists of
entrepreneurship such as Schumpter understand entrepreneurs as figures who create
opportunities through innovations, and others such as Kirzner view entrepreneurs as discoverers,
i.e. those who recognize and exploit opportunities within the market. Further, writers such as
McCaffrey and Salerno use a Kiznerian framework that has political entrepreneurs being alert to
“opportunities to profit from the political system”. Other writers on this topic such as Frohlich
and Oppenheimer have viewed political entrepreneurs as, “an individual who invests his own
time or other resources to coordinate and combine other factors of production to supply
collective goods” while others such as Wagner have them as figures who “will seek out
innovations in the political sphere which yield political profits”. Wagner himself conceives of
political entrepreneurs as those who, “takes leadership of an issue in order to advance a personal
agenda (of which finding a solution to the issue at hand may be part, but only part), possibly
parlaying his public spirit into a political career, a network of contacts, future remuneration for
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his legal practice, etc.”.19 This paper takes a different approach to political entrepreneurship than
the existing literature in order to better understand the specifics of Indian politics.
This paper conceives of political entrepreneurship as those who hope to gain political
power and influence by exploiting existing “holes” in the space left by other political actors.
Political actors act to exploit those gaps to create their own political base of support and achieve
long-term goals of patronage allocation, policy objectives, and political influence. The essential
idea is that politicians are rational actors who exist to represent structural fissures within the
societies they exist in. They do not invent identities, nor do they invent salient political issues,
though they can reframe and articulate the specific way those issues and identities are expressed.
They can express this relationship in either a cynical, transactional manner, merely trying to cut
into the political system for patronage, or for greater ideological or political projects. Regardless
of the reason behind exploiting these fissures, every political movement has to identify some
social or ideological base in order to survive beyond the individual charisma of the leader of the
political movement. Without some sort of ideological or identity core, no political entrepreneur
can propel their movement forward long-term.
This relationship can best be seen in political systems with low cost for creating new
political forces, i.e. where it is easy for political actors to set out on their own and create their
own specific niche. For instance, in the American political context, where there are political
high-costs for politicians leaving the two-party system, political actors are constrained in the
coalition they can form and the constituency they can represent. Due to the existence of high
19Snigdha

Dewal. "Governance and Political Entrepreneurship in India: Case Studies of Gujarat and Bihar."George
Mason University, 2016. https://proxy.wm.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/dissertations-theses/
governance-political-entrepreneurship-india-case/docview/1774429047/se-2?accountid=15053.
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incumbency rates for legislative seats, due to gerrymandering and uncompetitive primaries, it is
extremely difficult to enter the American political system outside of the internal party primary.20
The primary thus becomes the main vector of political alignment and for political actors to form
novel coalitions even if that coalition represents a minority of the overall primary vote.21 The
Presidential System in America further exacerbates this tendency, as the logic of electoral
consolidation into two broad parties to maximize chances of Presidential victory makes it
difficult for smaller political movements to act as anything more than a spoiler. Comparatively,
in India, and systems with low cost for leaving political parties like proportional representation
systems, ample opportunities exist for political actors to create novel coalitions.
The system also creates highly competitive elections due to possibly rapid turnover in
election results, making it thus much easier for political actors to rapidly reconfigure and
represent existing, or new, tensions within society, but also more difficult for them to survive
long-term without some stable electoral base. Further, in a stark reversal in American politics,
anti-incumbency is a significant force in Indian politics, increasing the chances for entrance into
the political system for political actors opposed to the current government.22 This culminates
especially in the context of Indian politics, where caste, class, regional, and linguistic identity all
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create fissures within society which the plurality voting system prioritizes to win districts. Indian
political entrepreneurs are thus incentivized to fixate on staking out unique political coalitions to
mobilize political communities, lest another political actor do the same and steal their
constituency from them. The presidentialization of the Modi administration, with his singular
dominance ensuring a unique hegemony in discourse, has changed aspects of this theory
however, with Modi seemingly preferring a more centralized electoral calendar that will more
easily translate to down ballot success for the BJP compared to the more spread out calendar
India has had since the 1970s.23 Even with this recent limitation, the spread out electoral calendar
and electoral system does ensure that local political entrepreneurs do have a shot at entering the
political system in ways that are unique to India.
What this means for this study is a desire to explain the fragmentation created after the
decline of the INC, and how that has been impacted by the consolidation seen with the rise of the
BJP under Modi. The INC in its period of hegemony was unable to represent all the complicated
social and policy forces in Indian society, and due to the parliamentary nature of India could win
an electoral majority with vote shares only in the ~40% range. The constituencies and identities
they did not represent were taken up by their opponents. As the INC declined from 1989-2014,
this meant that local political actors, be they ex-INC defectors, regionalist politicians, local
bigwigs, ideological innovators, or new populist political forces, could all go out and attempt to
represent whatever constituency they could get their hands on. Patronage politics facilitated this,
and the politics of identity as it related to caste helped ensure that if a political actor could find a
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constituency that was underrepresented and numerous in key districts, they had a ticket to
political power. There are limits to this, as deliverable goods must be given to ensure continued
political success.
This political framework for political entrepreneurs fits in the unique Indian political
context as well. Western political frameworks understand voters as individual actors who
rationally choose political options based on a rational choice decision, namely which party will
“selfishly” benefit themself.24 However, in the Indian social context caste and religious
considerations matter most who voters choose to vote for,25 beyond what a simple individual
rational choice model would suggest. Caste politics frequently correlate with ideological
groupings, with Muslims, scheduled tribes, and scheduled castes mostly voting for the INC and
its centrist offshoots, and other left parties. Upper caste voters additionally have traditionally
shown a preference for the BJP and other right-wing parties. The centrality of caste and religious
voting concerns, even beyond economic class, age, gender, or educational status at the Federal
level,26 and also at the state level,27 make the rational mobilization of caste identity hugely
important.
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As the INC declined in the 1980s and 1990s, it was no longer able to successfully
represent the demands of its broad electoral base, so political actors found an opening to stake
their own electoral niches. This relationship is seen throughout the cases discussed in this study,
as well as how the BJP rose to prominence in the first place. Originally, the BJP attempted to
exploit the decline of the INC across India through their intense, programmatic advocacy of
Hindu Nationalism in the 1980s, which greatly contributed to their meteoric rise through that
decade. In West Bengal, the demand for land reform and agrarian justice against the incumbent
INC government was taken up by the CPI(M) and allowed it to take power in 1977. In Tamil
Nadu, it was Tamil linguistic nationalism and anti-Brahmin sentiment against an upper-caste INC
government, which was taken up by the DMK, winning power in 1967. In Maharashtra, the
fragmentation of the Marathi elite as the INC declined sprouted two unique political parties, the
NCP and the SHS. All of this means that as Indian democracy became more established and
institutionalized, the INC faced political actors mobilizing important identities and issues which
threatened the INC’s dominance of their state. The nature of the INC as well ensured it was
especially vulnerable to this, as it has proven poor in integrating local, ambitious political
entrepreneurs into its party structure.
Internal weakness within the INC structure comes from the dynastic nature of the party
dominated by the Gandhis which limits the ambitions of ambitious leaders to have a viable path
to party leadership and influence. This means that the most competent and charismatic
figureheads of the party, those with real local power bases capable of assisting the party, have the
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great incentives to split the party and form their own party.28 This weakening of the INC at the
local level is matched by a national INC leadership that is more focused on maintaining control
of the party leadership than winning elections. Rahul Gandhi’s tenure has brought these problems
especially to roost, as his leadership has proven incapable of mobilizing on popular issues that
matter to the state electorates and instead focuses on national issues and the person of Modi
which has severely limited their mass appeal.29 The INC is thus a fatally weakened institution
even as it remains the second-largest political movement in India, and much of the responsibility
for that failure rests with the inability of the Gandhi dynasty to manage local elites and create a
viable merit-based political movement. The party now faces huge challenges to being a viable
challenger to Modi as the 2024 parliamentary election looms on the horizon. Comparatively, the
INC’s rivals do not have this issue. As they lack the historically decentralized nature of the INC
and history of splits, and were forced to stake out their own political constituency amid INC
hegemony. The BJP fits into this framework perfectly.
Compared to the INC, the BJP under Modi is a vastly more centralized, competent, and
viable electoral organ due to its elite party nature. As the party is predominated by high-caste
interests, and a close relationship with the Hindu-nationalist family of parties, it allows it a
degree of centralization and unity that put it apart from other Indian political parties.30 The
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party’s original base was high-caste voters31 based on its exclusionary, elitist conception of
Hindu nationalism, from figures such as Savarkar, seen as the founder and most important
ideologue of modern Hindu Nationalism and K.B. Hedgewar, the founder of the RSS, both of
whom supported the caste system and the Laws of Manu tract.32 However, the party was able to
mobilize outside of this narrow constituency, in spite of its elite base that precluded radical
redistributional policies.
The party first expanded out of its narrow caste constituency in the 1980s. They first
attempted this by promoting economic nationalism and domestic production, but then evolved
after the 1990s liberalization reforms. The party still kept a form of nationalist Hindu antiglobalism, such as opposing beef exports and junk food imports, while also keeping its more
elitist, pro-market tint by limiting budget spending on welfare for poorer Indians, which was seen
in the party’s record in performance in Gujarat and the 1999-2004 Vajpayee Government.33 In
spite of these innovations in the 1990s through 200s, the party had difficulty expanding outside
its North Indian, Hindi speaking base, even as it’s communalist agitation on Hindu supremacy
allowed it a stunning electoral increase across the 1980s: from only 7.74% of the vote and 2 seats
in 1984, to 20.08% of the vote and 120 seats in 1991. This explosion of support was in part
facilitated by the Ram Temple dispute that ate up an immense amount of public attention and
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fueled Hindu nationalism in this period.34 Contrary to the party’s elitist welfare conception, the
party did have low-caste and poor support through the provision of welfare services through
affiliated Hindu charity organizations, in a way similar to but distinct from the informal
patronage network the INC utilized to mobilize poor voters.35 However, the party’s inherent
weakness among poor voters limited the party’s electoral power throughout the 2000s and early
2010s, as the INC recovered under Manmohan Singh and Sonia Gandhi. The rise of Modi in
2014 would greatly expand the vote base of the BJP in a profound manner, while keeping the
basic form the party had formed.
Modi honed his unique blend of Hindu nationalism and populism as Chief Minister of
Gujarat from 2001-2014. This laid the basis to test the style that has proven to have immense
appeal to the Indian electorate, especially his perception as a highly competent and honest
politician from the masses fighting the secular order to keep India safe from Muslim threats and
on the path to prosperity.36 After the height of the BJP in their landslide 2019 electoral victory,
which further entrenched their government at the national level, and combined with authoritarian
tendencies37 that have quashed dissent within India,38 it has appeared the Modi government was
unassailable. Yet in each of the cases, the BJP and its allies have faced defeat in recent elections,
and face a much more difficult fight in Uttar Pradesh than its landslide 2017 victory would
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suggest. The main reasons for this weakness highlights the fundamental, structural weaknesses of
the BJP and Modi in achieving a hegemonic status in Indian politics, due to the nature of
political entrepreneurship in India.
There are three challenges this paper lays out as a research design to highlight limitations
to the BJP’s creation of a hegemonic party system across India. The first challenge is the
centrality of rural policy to any successful Indian political movement. India remains a
predominantly rural country39 and so rural politics remain hugely significant. In each of the
cases, the votes of farmers have proven decisive, and anger at the BJP or its allies over agrarian
issues have proven decisive to the electoral outcome. Whether or not the BJP has been able to
successfully mobilize farmers, and address their concerns, is thus a huge point that will be
examined in each case. This paper theorizes that failures in BJP rural policy will decrease
support for the BJP and empower its rivals to mobilize on a salient political issue, thus
weakening the BJP’s hegemony of the policy atmosphere and allowing its rivals to decrease its
support. The second challenge this paper lays out is that the BJP has had to try and displace
existing political actors in each state they have expanded in. Along with the remaining INC
forces in each state, these parties can vary hugely from Communist parties, ex-INC parties like
the NCP or TMNC, caste-based parties like the SP or JDU, or regionalist parties like the DMK
and TGP. As a result, the BJP has had to build up its organizational capacity in each state or
make alliances with other parties in the NDA to gain influence. This paper theorizes that already
successful state parties, which had to themselves enter an already existing party system in their
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state and create a lasting political coalition, are going to be more capable of opposing the BJP
than the Indian National Congress. The lessons learned from entering the political scene in each
party's case means that it will have greater institutional organization, political flexibility, and
leadership able to successfully win out over other opposition forces in the state. This history is
essential in the party’s creating a united opposition front to successfully oppose the BJP in the
state.
On top of the two other reasons, regional identity has proven incredibly important in
modern Indian history and politics, which makes it a third challenge to BJP hegemony in India.
Compared to most other electoral democracies, localist political parties representing a state or
community have immense political influence in India, and dominate or are present in almost
every Indian state. No other electoral democracy has as many state parties exerting such a large
amount of electoral influence in states,40 due to the amazing linguistic, ethnic, and religious
diversity in India and linguistic federalism in India. This paper theorizes that the creation of
another layer of identity that these linguistic or regionalist states create allows political
entrepreneurs to mobilize on an identity that puts the BJP at a significant disadvantage compared
to regions where that regional identity is weaker, or where the BJP shares that regional tie, as in
the Hindu Belt.
Other lesser factors also show themselves. The BJP under Modi has proven to be almost
too successful, as Modi is so closely tied with his party and state leaders so subservient to him,
that anger at Modi translates to anger at BJP generally. There is also a converse effect, where the
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figureheads of the BJP, Modi and others, are liked, but the party generally is seen as corrupt and
ineffective, which creates a “good tsar, bad boyars” relationship that hurts the party’s long-term
ability to maintain power. In each state, there is a decrease in the Modi effect, i.e. a decrease
between how the state voted in the national 2019 elections and the state elections. In Tamil Nadu
the relationship is so severe as to show a reverse Modi effect, where the AIADMK actually did
better in the 2021 state elections than their 2019 performance at the national level, due to their
association with the BJP. This means that Modi, while a federal electoral asset, has had problems
mobilizing voters when national considerations are not front and center. Additionally, the
influence of covid-19 in delegitimizing the Modi government’s effectiveness cannot be
understated,41 as it has highlighted the Federal government’s failings while focusing the election
on local issues and not more national considerations, further limiting Modi’s ability to be a votegetter.
For each case, the main question at the heart of this paper is how parties in each case
have reacted to the rise of the BJP, and what movements, be they state parties or the INC, have
been best able to react to this politically successful coalition. This paper theorizes that statebased, regionalist political parties will be successful in each case of opposing the BJP, and the
paper also hopes to prove that these explanations have greater salience across the rest of India as
well. The example of Uttar Pradesh will be used in order to act as a fresh counterexample in
order to examine the applicability of this theory broadly across India, and how it operates in the
BJP’s home base of the Hindi Belt.
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Maharashtra
Background
One would not expect Maharashtra to become a base for the BJP in India given the
predominance Marathi politics have had in the state since independence, especially since the
state is a bastion of the Congress. The Indian National Congress ruled the state from
independence until being displaced by the Janata Party in 1977, from 1980-1995, and from
1999-2014. This enviable electoral record makes the INC a historic powerhouse in the state, or
one would presume. The traditional caste alliance of INC parties, with local rural and urban
notables being linked to a coalition with lower-caste, poor voters, especially dalit and Muslim
voters, and fueled by patronage, worked extremely well in Maharashtra given the dominance of
Marathi’s in the state. The caste, which is the single largest in the state at around 33% and which
dominates Mumbai and most rural areas of the state, is traditionally the most important vector for
politics.42 In the INC’s heyday, they dominated the Marathi elite and were able to rule the state
with very little challenge to its power, beyond internal INC factionalism. Sharad Pawar
represents this factionalism best, given his extremely long-lasting influence in the state since the
late 1970s, becoming Chief Minister on three separate occasions.
In the landslide anti-INC wave of 1978, the INC managed to hold on even after losing
159 seats by joining together the two factions in the state, the INC and INC(Indira). However,
Pawar was angered by someone else being chosen for Chief Minister, so he intrigued to topple
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the Chief Minister, form his own INC breakaway party, the INC (Socialist), and became Chief
Minister with the backing of the Janata Party. He managed to rule until 1980 when Indira
Gandhi, upon her return to power, imposed President’s Rule on the state and fresh elections in
1980 saw the united INC win back power.43 Though his party performed adequately in the 1980
election, helped by his tactical alliance with the SHS and the Janata Party, he lost most of his
MLAs to defections after Indira’s assassination. After a poor performance in the 1985 election
caused further defection, he merged his party with the INC.44 He managed to become Chief
Minister twice as head of the INC, from 1988-1991 and 1993-1995. However, the INC was
defeated in the 1995 Maharashtra elections by the alliance of the BJP and SHS, first formed in
the 1990 election and led by SHS parliamentary leader Manohar Soshi. Shiv Sena is the other
pillar of Marathi dominance in the state, as it has tried to mobilize a different coalition compared
to the INC.
While the party has not been in government often in the state, Shiv Sena, since its
founding by Bal Thackeray in 1966, has represented the most Marathi-nationalist force in the
state. A long-time journalist and activist, the SHS got started as the party of Marathi anger
against the waves of migrant workers going to the state for jobs in bustling Mumbai, with
Thackeray publishing lists of South Indians holding positions of power in Mumbai, positions that
should have been rightfully Marathi. It was agitation about a border dispute between
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Maharashtra and Karnataka in 1969 that really thrust his movement to prominence, when
Thackeray led a Sena morcha that was fired upon on orders from the Deputy Prime Minister
Moraji Desai, killing 56 people and resulting in the arrest of Thackeray and his allies. The
resulting week of riots and street violence forced the Chief Minister Vasantrao Naik to ask
Thackeray to ask his followers to stand down, which he assented to, cementing his power in
Mumbai. Thackeray over the next two decades slowly built up power in Mumbai by, with the
assent of the INC, destroying the power of Communist trade unions in Mumbai and Thane to
ensure his dominance of the street. He then used tactical seat alliances to slowly gain power,
strategically making alliances with everyone from Sharad Pawar to the BJP to socialist parties.
He further added a wrinkle to the ethnic nationalism of the SHS by adopting Hindu nationalist
stances in the 1980s as the BJP gained momentum.45 It further cemented its strength due to the
horrific communal rioting that rocked Mumbai in 1992, which cemented communal antagonism
in the city. The SHS has dominated the municipal corporation of Mumbai ever since.46 All of this
ensured that by 1995, the SHS was the second-largest party in Maharashtra, even as the BJP
began mobilizing high-caste and Hindutva voters. This did not mean the state was becoming a
BJP stronghold, however.
Soshi’s SHS-BJP government lasted a full four years, but was defeated by the resurgent
INC in 1999, though the election set up the new standard for the state’s politics. Sharad Pawar
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left the INC in 1999 over his anger that the “foreigner” Sonia Gandhi, who was Italian, was
taking charge of the INC, and formed his own party, the Nationalist Congress Party. Pawar’s
electoral organ managed to perform quite well, dominating the rural parts of Maharashtra and
especially the Western region of the state. The party has attempted to mobilize young voters in
Mumbai, but has never managed to break into the urban areas of the state.47 This election result
ensured a hung parliament, with neither the INC nor the NDA having a majority, so Pawar’s NCP
became the kingmaker. In a surprise move given his recent defection from the INC, he joined up
with the INC to form a coalition government. This coalition would go on to rule the state
continuously from 1999-2014, and witnessed the culmination of several trends that allowed the
BJP to rise in the state.
Fragmentation of the party system in Maharashtra allowed the vaunted INC electoral
coalition, combining the Marathi elite with poor voters, to become undone. The slow and steady
unraveling of Marathi elite cohesion since the 1980s meant that, almost glacially slow, the INCdominated Marathi party system slowly lost out. This is unique compared to most other states in
India in this case study, as West Bengal saw clean breaks with the INC in 1977, and then the
Communists in 2011, and in Tamil Nadu with the INC in 1962. As elites became more
decentralized, going to the INC, NCP, SHS, and with smaller breakaway parties like the MNS,
founded by a member of the Thackeray family in 2005 as an even more extreme Marathi
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nationalist party.48 The voters themselves also began to disassociate from the preferences of
Marathi elites. In 2009, 54 seats went to independents and to parties that won less than 6% of the
vote, larger than both the BJP’s and SHS’s seat totals.49 Fragmentation among the elite due to
political entrepreneurship, namely Pawar’s development of power among rural farmers in
Western Maharashtra, and Thackeray’s mobilization of Marathas in Mumbai, helped create this
political opening. That both were able to develop electoral niches for themselves, while
remaining electorally relevant, reveals the strength of the success of political entrepreneurship in
the state. Instead of withering away, the state has proven to have a strong demand for the style of
politics the two parties, so unlike ideologically, have in keeping their base together. The entry of
the BJP into the state in the 1980s further cemented this siloed political fragmentation, as it
created an electoral base of voters left out of the Marathi coalitions. Along with the INC with its
traditional state-wide base among Dalits, Muslims, and other Marathi communities, it created a
two-coalition system where the non-Marathi party joined with a Marathi party to govern. It
proved an enduring political constellation, as the NCP with the INC throughout 1999-2014 and
the SHS keeping with the BJP. It took the rise of Modi to finally break the spell and remake the
state’s politics.
2014 Maharashtra Election
As much of a shock the 2014 general election was to India on the whole, the 2014
Maharashtra election was a shock to the state. The BJP, for the first time, became the single
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largest party, due to their innovative electoral strategy, and competed without the SHS for the
first time since the 1990s. Similar to its national strategy, the party expanded outside its
traditional base of urban middle-class and Brahmins by focusing on the OBC community. The
BJP itself, while winning only 27% of the overall vote, bagged 52% of the upper caste vote and
38% among OBCs,50 while also winning 52 out of 99 seats in urban areas. The Congress parties
managed to hold on in rural areas,51 but they still saw the loss of over 60 seats between them.
Independents and small parties were almost wiped out, as instead of 54 seats the third force in
the state’s politics52 bagged only 20 seats. BJP strategy also benefited heavily from the personal
charisma and popularity of Modi, who, competing along with the SHS at the Federal level, won
42 out of 48 constituencies in the state mere months earlier. This provided the main push for
BJP’s knockout results, as Modi campaigned heavily in the state to win his party a majority.53
The BJP, led by Devendra Fadnavis, did not win a majority, and at first considered a coalition
with NCP, which had abandoned its own alliance with the INC months earlier.54 Nothing came of
this dalliance, as the BJP ended up forming a coalition with Shiv Sena under Bal Thackeray’s
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youngest son, Uddhav Thackeray by December.55 The state ended up seemingly casting out the
Congress parties and potentially broke the two-coalition system of Marathi+non-Marathi politics,
forcing a recalibration and threat to the traditional political entrepreneurs in the state who had
created a lucrative and powerful niche for themselves. Further, the BJP had a choice in either
attempting to integrate itself with Maratha elites and slowly displace the SHS and Congress
parties for dominance there, or focus its mobilization on cementing its urban and OBC base.56
What the BJP in the state ended up deciding would set the stage for the 2019 election and the
creation of a truly novel coalition government.
The 2019 Election
Going into the 2019 election, the BJP was confident that it had played the coalition game
to remain in power. It was hoped that Modi’s revocation of Article 370 of the Indian constitution
after the 2019 Indian general election, which pushed discourse in the BJP’s home turf of national
defense, and also popular social welfare schemes Modi had introduced, would boost the downballot BJP in the state. However, in a possible sign of discontent, the BJP did not gain in the state
in the general election earlier that year, as the result, besides the INC losing 2 seats and the SHS
gaining some votes, was the exact same as in 2014. The policies the BJP pushed through in the
state, in their attempt to create a lasting political coalition, so threatened the existing balance of
power in the state that in the state election, not only did the NDA coalition lose a surprising
amount of seats, but the BJP itself found itself pushed out of power and, for the first time, the
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Congress parties governed with Shiv Sena. This unexpected result belies the expected BJP
dominance in the state.
The First Fadnavis Cabinet from 2014-2019 had embarked on a series of policies that had
attempted to ensure the BJP would become the dominant party in Maharashtra. This strategy had
flaws from the start. Fadnavis had been chosen as the BJP’s Chief Minister candidate
unexpectedly, over long-time BJP veterans Nitin Gadkari and Eknath Khadse. Further, he was a
Brahmin, who only accounted for 3-8% of Maharashtra, compared to the around 31% who are
Maratha. This was part of a BJP strategy to consolidate non-Maratha voters under the BJP
umbrella, a model it had used in Haryana to great success.57 Further, while in office Fadnavis had
governed hierarchically, prioritizing bureaucratic-driven administration over grassroots
mobilization, which, to his enemies within the BJP, isolated him from the party’s base and larger
party while surrounding himself with a loyal clique. This isolation of Fadnavis from his BJP
allies fed party disunity, especially as party heavy-hitters such as Khadse, part of the Leva Patil
community which has electoral significant pockets in northern Maharashtra, and Chandrashekhar
Bavankule, an OBC influential in Vidarbha, lost out their nominations to their seats. Combined
with a strategy of courting defections from the Congress party representatives, this undercut BJP
unity.58 These concerns exacerbated the poor political conditions for the BJP in Maharashtra due
to their record of governance, which the Congress parties exploited.

57Dhaval

Kulkarni,"Maharashtra Assembly Elections 2019: Local Versus 'National' Issues." Economic and Political
Weekly, Last Modified Nov 09, 2019, Page 2 https://proxy.wm.edu/login?url=https://www-proquestcom.proxy.wm.edu/magazines/maharashtra-assembly-elections-2019-local-versus/docview/2313351618/se-2?
accountid=15053.
58Kulkarni,

“Maharashtra Assembly Elections 2019: Local versus 'National' Issues” page 3

Markel 39

In office, the Fadnavis government had attempted to break the Congress political machine
within the Maratha community through rural policy. The cooperative sector was one of the
biggest targets of the BJP government, especially as declining sugar prices had devastated rural
incomes. This highly Maratha sector, based mostly in Western Maharashtra, is a base of Sharad
Pawar, especially as during the Congress coalition he had prioritized protections for the industry
and farmer protections. However, the BJP was perceived to handle the sector poorly, as the
industry was hit hard by demonetization and the government provided little assistance to the
district cooperative banks, which was exacerbated by increased income tax enforcement on the
sugar cooperatives. A committee appointed by the Center to investigate drought and flooding in
Maharashtra, led by Sunil Kendrekar, a local Aurangabad’s divisional commander, recommended
the banning of growing sugar in drought-prone regions across Maharashtra,59 which further
discredited the BJP in the eyes of this key constituency.
Beyond the sugar industry, rural Maharashtra was in crisis by 2019. farmers' protests
broke out in late 2018 and early 2019 due to “persistent droughts, hailstorms, and unequal
distribution of water for irrigation” pushing farmers into deep poverty. Overproduction had
lessened incomes for soya bean and cotton producers, on top of insect infestations, pesticide
exposure deaths, and rising debts had pushed many farmers toward suicide, all of which caused a
breaking point for farmers. The BJP’s electoral campaign promises of doubled farmers' incomes,
loan waivers, crop insurance schemes, and remunerative prices for produce, all had not been
fully implemented, which further distanced farmers, predominantly Marathas, from the BJP in
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key constituencies.60 Shiv Sena managed to avoid the blame for this poor implementation in rural
areas due to their agitations against private insurance companies for their failure to implement
Pradhan Mantri Fasal Bima Yojana, a farmer insurance program enacted by Modi. The backlash
from rural voters was so severe for the BJP that Fednavis’ agricultural minister was defeated by a
farmers' organization activist in the 2019 election.61 It was not just rural Marathas who were
angered by the BJP’s rural policy, as the caste policy of the BJP had failed to resolve the party’s
weakness among that key community.
The BJP under the Fadnavis government had attempted a two-pronged effort to create a
caste coalition in Maharashtra. Fadnavis had publicly backed a 16% Maratha reservation in the
2014 campaign, in order to alleviate unemployment in the state and gain electoral benefits. The
decision was a long-time demand among the Maratha’s going all the way back to the 1990s, with
marches by the community in favor of the proposal starting in 2016, but was subject to a lengthy
legal battle when it was passed in 201862 until it was eventually ruled unconstitutional in 2021.63
Further, neoliberal reforms by the government lessened the possibility of the reservation to
alleviate unemployment, as government jobs were cut or left vacant (around 35% according to
one metric) and education privatized, thus making the overall amount of government jobs
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smaller and lessening the impact of the reservation among unemployed Marathi youth.64
Conversely, outreach to Maratha elites was energetic, with even descendants of Shivaji Maharaj
being put forward as candidates, which created an impression that the party did not really
understand the Maratha community beyond playing at regional symbols.65 This Maratha outreach
policy was in spite of the BJP’s traditional strategy of empowering OBCs in the state, which
alienated this broad community from its traditional alliance with the BJP. The conflict Fadnavis
had with prominent BJP figures like Khadse and Munde further had a caste dynamic, as these
OBC figures were displaced by the Brahmin Fadnavis and replaced by Maratha figures who
lacked legitimacy within the party and broadly across Maharashtra.66 All of this ensured that the
BJP had significant weakness within Maharashtra leading to the 2019 elections, which was
capitalized by Sharad Pawar and other political entrepreneurs.
The mobilization by Pawar to defeat the BJP, even as he said he would possibly join a
BJP government in 2014, highlights the enduring flexibility and opportunism of a prototypical
political entrepreneur. Pawar had seen many of his MLAs defect to the BJP since, had seen his
party perform poorly in the Lok Sabha elections earlier in 2019, and further had been targeted by
the Enforcement Directorate for a money-laundering case before the 2019 campaign, all of which
seemed poised to ruin Pawar’s political fortunes. He managed to fight back and force the ED to
relent, but it created a lasting impression that the BJP was targeting a key opposition figure,
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especially one as veteran and respected as Pawar.67 He soon began touring the state mobilizing
support, partly to sideline his nephew Ajit Pawar, who was perceived to be interested in a linkup
with the BJP.68 In one of the most memorable moments of the campaign he gave a rally in Satara
during heavy rains, refusing an umbrella as, “Varun Raja has blessed the NCP. With his
blessings, Satara district will now do magic in the upcoming polls” and then launched a savage
attack against the BJP-SHS government.69 He especially focused on Maratha pride and identity
during the campaign, focusing on the threat that the Center posed against the Marathas, and
making rural issues the central theme of the campaign, and not the national issues that dominated
the BJP campaign.70 He further consciously promoted its OBC leaders, from the old guard like
Sunil Tatkare, to rising leaders like Amol Kolhe, linking Maratha and OBC concerns in the rural
economy, which gained significant OBC support.71 This focus on every weakness of the BJP in
the state was possible due to Sharad Pawar’s unique status as long-time entrepreneur with
everything to lose from electoral defeat, and so mobilized tenaciously.
Due to this strategy, the NCP thus consolidated its support within the Marathi community
while winning increased support from OBCs. This helps explain its consolidation in Western
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Maharashtra, its traditional stronghold, but also in North Maharashtra, Marathwada, and
Vidarbha. The party experienced a 13 seat rise, highlighting Sharad Pawar’s successful
mobilization of both regional Maratha identity with rural discontent given his unique place as
one of the most flexible political entrepreneurs in the state. The stakes were extremely high for
the party to win or face possible extinction, and jail for Pawar, and so the party was able to use
its tight electoral organization to try and maintain its power base through an explicitly localized
campaign. This is compared to the mixed electoral outcomes of the SHS and INC in the same
election.
The Shiv Sena, even though it was associated with the BJP government, also showed
political flexibility in surviving a poor incumbent condition. The party had historically been
larger than the BJP in the state and Bal Thackeray had always flaunted this fact, but Modi’s rise
had lessened this dominance. The breakup of the SHS-BJP alliance meant the party lost its
influence over BJP policy, especially given the NCP was willing to join with the BJP in
government after the 2014 election. However, the party was not happy with its now subordinate
position, as the two parties had sniped at each other over the 5 years of the coalition. Further, the
party faced rare rebellions, as of the 13 independent legislators elected in the 2019 election were
Shiv Sena or BJP leaders who ran against the official nominees of either party, which ensured the
Thackeray family lost its traditional home seat in Mumbai. The 2019 election also was the first
time members of the Thackeray family had directly fought in elections or been put forward as
Chief Minister, ending the division between the party leadership and legislative wing. The reason
for the consolidation of the SHS by the Thackeray’s was thus obvious, as the party had much to
lose from a consolidating BJP, especially as the two fought tenaciously for control of the
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lucrative Mumbai civic corporation.72 The Thackeray’s thus faced a decision: keep with the BJP
and slowly find itself cut out from its base as the BJP capitalized on Modi and Indian
nationalism, or try and fight the BJP and risk losing control of its Mumbai fiefdom. Further,
internal anger within the party was rising as the party accepted running fewer candidates than the
BJP, with Uddhav Thackeray apologizing for not negotiating a 50:50 split of seats and for his
party’s limited influence in government.73 Thus, Uddhav Thackeray, as a rational political
entrepreneur fearing eventual political irrelevance, was primed to pursue an independent policy
vis-a-vis the hegemonic BJP.
Compared to the NCP and SHS, the INC seemed utterly unconcerned about the election.
Sonia Gandhi did not even campaign in the election, and when Rahul Gandhi came to speak at
the Dharavi constituency in Mumbai, he focused on national issues like aircraft purchases. This
was instead of focusing on the specific concerns of the constituency, which had seen its leather
industry hurt by the government decision to ban cow slaughter and had been hit hard by
demonetisation. The party still gained 2 seats, due to mobilization by Zeeshan Siddique in
Mumbai among poor Marathi-speaking voters, a traditional Sena constituency, and which
capitalized, almost by accident, on anti-incumbency the BJP had provoked.74 Thus the INC, a
party who could capitalize on its own inertia to win most elections, continued its unpopular
electoral strategy and found itself behind both the SHS and NCP to a fourth place finish. Smaller
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parties also did well in this election, with the most notable being Vanchit Bahujan Aghadi led by
Prakash Ambedkar, grandson of Dr Ambedkar, who had attempted a Dalit-Muslim alliance
against the traditional parties of Maharasthra.75 The party did well, winning 4.5% of the vote but
winning no seats, and was blamed by Pawar and the INC for acting as a spoiler, stopping it from
winning more seats and votes in both the Federal and State elections.
After the results of the election, the BJP found itself politically isolated. The alliance
between the BJP and SHS broke down immediately, as both sides began mutual recrimination
and allegations of not following through with agreed deals.76 Negotiations between the SHS,
NCP, and INC on forming a government began immediately, but Fadnavis announced he had
formed a government with the NCP under Ajit Pawar. After legal and political wrangling, Ajit
returned to the fold and Sharad Pawar announced he had formed a majority coalition with Shiv
Sena, the NCP, and the INC.77 The Thackeray cabinet thus took power, marking for the first time
a Thackeray Chief Minister, and an alliance between the vigorously nationalist Shiv Sena and
secular Congress parties.
Faced with a BJP that threatened all of their interests, Pawar had managed to create a
highly diverse political coalition and survive at the pinnacle of Maratha politics for one more
legislative term. The coalition, while surprising ideologically for every party involved, makes
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sense given the nature of the political entrepreneurs involved. Sharad Pawar and Uddhav
Thackeray depend on maintaining their constituency to remain relevant, and the BJP was the
biggest threat to their continued existence.78 They represent differing, and almost exclusive,
electoral coalitions, and so can quite cynically join together safe in the knowledge each will not
seriously hurt the other. Thus, it counts as a victory for localist politicians in defeating a national
party that threatened their interests, and has managed to survive as a coalition even in spite of
internal fighting.79 Maharashtra also highlights the salience of rural politics and caste-regional
identities that act as a programmatic wedge against the BJP. It further highlights that state
political entrepreneurs have to focus their attention and resources on their respective state
elections. Compared to an INC that made the strategic decision to not waste its resources in what
it considered a doomed campaign, the NCP and SHS had to fight and orient themselves to
survive long-term, as each party lacked the strategic depth of the INC. Thus, even as the state
parties were able to outmaneuver the BJP, it also highlights the inherently locally salient political
orientation of the party and how each faces possible problems expanding outside their welldeveloped electoral niche compared to the more versatile INC and BJP.

78"A Shift

in the Politics of Maharashtra." Economic and Political Weekly, Last Modified Nov 30, 2019, Pages 2-3
https://proxy.wm.edu/login?url=https://www-proquest-com.proxy.wm.edu/magazines/shift-politics-maharashtra/
docview/2321084994/se-2?accountid=15053.
79Manoj

Dattatrye More,“Explained: Tracking the Churn in Maharashtra's Ruling Coalition.” The Indian Express,
Last Modified July 15, 2021. https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/maharashtra-ncp-congress-shiv-senabjp-7401498/.

Markel 47

Tamil Nadu
Background
Tamil Nadu is unique in India for its totally regionalized political party system. Since
1967, Dravidian parties have ruled the state, as it was one of the first states to totally displace the
INC. A two-party system developed by the 1980s between the All India Anna Dravida Munnetra
Kazhagam (AIADMK) and the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK), with smaller Dravidian
parties competing in the mix as well. The Indian National Congress has always had a presence in
the state, but after the 1960s it has been marginalized, usually competing along the Dravidian
parties or by itself, and the BJP historically has never really had a unique breakthrough in the
state compared to the rest of India. However, as India turned into a two-party coalition system in
the 1990s at the federal level, both Dravidian parties joined with the Bharatiya Janata Party’s
National Democratic Alliance (NDA) or the Indian National Congress’ United Progressive
Alliance (UPA) as the situation demanded in order to gain federal benefits. This alliance-making,
originally pragmatic, has now cemented into a party system mirroring the Federal divide between
the BJP and INC. The state’s 2021 election thus provides key details about what can happen
when two state parties compete against each other in a federalized and polarized atmosphere in
the two-coalition system.
Dravidian parties themself evolved from political movements from India’s colonial
period. Compared to Northern India, which was dominated by Muslim dynasties going back to
the original Ghazi dynasty in the 12th century, Tamil Nadu kept the country’s indigenous social
and class makeup over time. As the British came to dominate and rule the land of Tamil Nadu,
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elite Brahmins began exerting influence in the British administration to achieve dominance there.
As the 19th century progressed into the 20th century and urbanization and cultural literacy
spread, this activated landowning non-Brahmins, who historically had been in a social alliance
with the Brahmins. Elite members of this landowning non-Brahmin community began agitating
and formulating a position distinct from that of the mostly Home Rule-supporting Brahmins, and
so a specific Tamil cultural nationalism ideology began to be formed in the 1920s with the
moderate Justice Party and the radical Self-Respect Movement.80 This meant in Tamil Nadu, as
time progressed the state developed a conflict between the Brahmin-dominated INC, with Tamil
nationalists divided between moderates and radicals.81 This dichotomy did ensure the state had a
regionalist politics earlier than almost any other state in India, compared to the more
communalist agitation seen in Northern India, with the Muslim League combatting the INC.
The Tamil nationalist movement charted a new course in 1944 as Periyar E.V.
Ramasamy, the long-time leader of the Justice Party, founded the Dravidar Kazhagam, helped by
his lieutenant C.N. Annadurai, as a radical Dravidian party. The party was split though Annadurai
who wanted social reform, independence, and entry into mass parliamentary politics, and
Periyar, who wanted to focus on social reform and then independence and politics, partly due to
his long-time association with the British.82 This conflict over strategy ensured that in 1949,
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Annadurai, who was explicitly anti-Hindu, pro-land reform, anti-caste, and a distinct Tamil
community, would leave the DK and found the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam, the DMK, along
with other electoralists from the DK, more than 3/4ths of members of the DK.83 This movement
was targeted specifically to win power electorally against the predominantly Brahmin Indian
National Congress at the time, who had ruled the Madras State (modern Tamil Nadu, parts of
Karnataka, and Andhra Pradesh) since the 1930s after the state was opened to local elections by
the British authorities.84 After the party’s founding, it led a series of protests and agitations
against the INC government, namely early on after their 1952 electoral debut on education bills
they demeaned “caste”,85 but the INC under Kamaraj Nadar developed a strong electoral base
under Brahmins, landowning non-Brahmins, and a mass base from patronage networks which
kept it in power throughout the 1950s and 1960s. Support by Periyar’s DK also helped keep the
INC alive among Tamil’s generally.86 This period where the DMK was out of power and building
its power professionalized it and gave it a tighter electoral grassroots, while also moderating its
ideology to be less anti-Hindu, abandoning its secessionist tendencies, to focus more explicitly
on their constituents, fighting for the “common man”.87 As the 1960s progressed, the DMK
focused on building alliances with other parties and attacking the INC record in office. INC
language policies were a large flashpoint, with compulsory Hindi in schools provoking fierce
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protests and riots,88 but also INC corruption, giving India’s states more power, and bread and
butter issues like inflation. With this litany of issues dragging the INC down, and amid a
generally bad atmosphere for the INC in 1967, the DMK won a decisive victory: winning 138
seats and with the entire Congress cabinet being defeated.89 A new era had dawned in Tamil
Nadu.
The DMK would go on to entrench Dravidian parties in Tamil Nadu. They soon
rechristened Madras state into Tamil Nadu in 1969,90 though Annadurai died within the year.
Party leadership then went to his long-time ally M Karunanidhi. He would go on to win another
legislative majority in 1971, cementing the Tamil politics of the state and further sidelining the
remnants of the INC. The success of the DMK in creating a sustainable electoral majority in the
state highlights the variable nature of political entrepreneurs. To be a political entrepreneur does
not mean one lacks ideology or strong political beliefs, but it does mean that one is able to find
existing issues within their society to mobilize politically. The mobilization of land reform, Tamil
politics, and anti-INC sentiment all combined to help the DMK leaders create a strong electoral
niche for themselves, which meant total dominance throughout the 1970s. During the period of
Congress dominance, they relied on patronage and upper-caste support, which forced the DMK
to aim “appeals at castes and classes not already politicized by Congress; by trying direct rather
than indirect methods of mobilization in order to erode that portion of the Congress vote based
on social deference; and by penetrating new regions and rural areas that the Dravidian movement
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had not yet thoroughly organized. In these attempts to expand support, the DMK articulated an
ideological alternative (Tamil cultural nationalism) and linked it to important pragmatic and
emotional issues, such as language”. This mobilization saw turnout shoot up through the 1960s,
from only 49.3% in 1957 to 76.8% in 1967.91 The DMK under Annadurai, and extended by
Karunanidhi, highlights the enduring electoral body created by the DMK to compete against the
INC, an organ that would soon develop into a distinct political tradition of its own.
The singular hegemony of the DMK did not last long. After the death of Annadurai, the
long-time DMK member and famous movie star M.G. Ramaachandran would soon leave the
DMK and found his own movement, the AIADMK. MGR, as Ramaachandran is better known,
would sweep to power in the 1977 elections based on his own unique blend of heroic,
charismatic populism based on his long-time film reputation.92 His party would go on to govern
for the next 10 years, and after his own death in 1989 the party leadership was eventually taken
up by J. Jayalalitha, a famous Tamil actress. From then on, the two parties would compete
against one another, the DMK led by Karunanidhi and the AIADMK led by Jayalalithaa, for the
next 7 elections between 1989-2016. Tamil politics had evolved into a unique political scene,
based on political entrepreneurs mobilizing local linguistic nationalism to cement a regional
system first against a powerful INC, and then against one another.
Tamil Politics, 1989-2016
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Tamil politics from the death of MGR to 2016 exhibited several unique characteristics.
As both the DMK and AIADMK had the same political heritage, they were, seemingly, both
populist, vaguely socialist, personalist, and aggressively Tamil. However, from these original
characteristics, they evolved into distinct political traditions to represent distinctive political
constituencies within the state. The DMK exhibited a form of “assertive” populism, which
attacked the narrow elite for limiting the power of the common people and so demanded greater
privileges for the common people. The people were mostly middle class, neither overtly Brahmin
nor Dalit focused, and was exhibited for its affirmative action policies for backward castes, land
reofrm, and expanded education. The DMK also showed itself more anti-Hindi and even antiHindu at times,93 helped by the atheistic positions of Karunanidhi and the rationalist position of
Keriyar.94 The AIADMK showed a different version of populism, which was more based on a
paternalistic idea of the great heroic leader protecting the less well-off, which was foundational
to MGR’s acting reputation. It showed itself through the party's free meals for school children,
which was in line with the party's policies of alleviating poverty but not disrupting the power
dynamics that cause poverty. It also was, at this point, more inclusive of other identities and
mobilized different identities than the DMK, mostly more Brahmin and Hindu than the DMK.95
This populist distinction is vital to political entrepreneurship, as creating distinct forms of
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populism meant mobilizing distinct communities that kept the two parties going over time, even
as the party's original founders died off. The quest for larger electoral bases facilitated the two
parties making national alliances for political clout and federal resources, as both parties joined
quite opportunistically the INC’s UPA and the BJP’s NDA.96 The truly important election of
Tamil Nadu before 2019 was the 2006 election, which introduced programmatic development to
the state more so than any other previous election.
The quest for even broader political coalitions means broadening a party’s populist base
and evolving into programmatic parties. Political entrepreneurs facilitate this development once
they have created an electoral niche for themselves, to expand out of that niche they must appeal
to a broader community and so must turn to more universalist and broader politics than their
initial more limited appeal. The 2006 election showed this element fully. The DMK in this
election campaigned on an electoral manifesto based on explicit universalist programs for the
poor and vulnerable. The party won the election over the AIADMK under Jayalalithaa, and even
though it only won a minority government, the party still attempted to push through its electoral
manifesto in full.97 The party still engaged in clientelism patronage and had one infamous
corruption scandal in a vote-buying scandal in a Thirumangalam by-election in 2009,98 but the
introduction of programmatic politics did change Tamil politics. It forced the AIADMK to adopt
programmatic universalism itself, though in its own unique way. Jayalalithaa criticized the DMK
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for not managing its ambitious programs competently and for making a society of, “parasites,
dependent on freebies, doles and sops”,99 but still put through its own electoral program focusing
on similar programs.100 The rise of Modi in 2014 and its aftermath further upset the state’s
politics, forcing political entrepreneurs in the state to reform their practices in key ways.
Originally, neither the DMK nor the AIADMK joined the BJP’s NDA in 2014. The DMK
had supported the INC government from 2004-2014, but had left the UPA for the 2014 election.
The AIADMK maintained its neutrality and ran on its own coalition, capitalizing on its
successful term in government since 2011. The BJP ran in the state along with smaller Dravidian
parties aligned to it with the NDA, which created a broad NDA coalition with the BJP as an
anchor. Together, the BJP achieved its best ever result in the state and the alliance itself gained
18.9% of the vote, winning 2 seats as the AIADMK won all other seats. This still was a huge
shock to the political system given the BJP had always been a hugely marginal political force in
Tamil Nadu. This innovation highlighted how minor Tamil political entrepreneurs were willing
to align with Modi to exploit his charisma for their own political ends. Jayalalithaa kept her
distance from the BJP through Modi’s term, as she was unwilling to subvert her own political
hegemony by aligning with an equally dominant politician in his own right. It took her death in
2016 at the age of 68, and the death of Karunanidhi in 2018 at the truly venerable age of 94, to
radically shift Tamil politics into a highly polarized referendum on the BJP.
2021 Tamil Election
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Tamil Nadu entered a new phase of its history upon the death of Jayalalithaa and
Karunanidhi. For the first time since 1989 for the AIADMK, and for the first time since 1969 for
the DMK, the parties would receive new leadership. The DMK would be led by Karunanidhi’s
son, MK Stalin, who had been a fixture of the party and his father’s deputy for decades. He was
so close with his father he was actually made Deputy Chief Minister in 2009, the first time
someone had been put in that position in Tamil Nadu’s history, and so had a long reputation as a
committed party man.101 Stalin had to endure some dynastic infighting from his older brother,102
but this did not stop him from going through with deep reforms of the party, asserting more
centralized control on the historically decentralized DMK dominated by regional party bosses,
which increased his own power within the party.103 Though the party succession was dynastic in
nature, Stalin, already an old man upon taking leadership of his party at the age of 66, had
proven his competence within the party and had even been mayor of Chennai from 1996-2002,
earning a reputation as a competent administrator.104 Thus, he took power with a developed party
and leadership behind him, allowing him to establish himself as a potent political entrepreneur
immediately upon taking power, unlike the AIADMK.
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By comparison, the AIADMK had a much more chaotic succession. Edappadi K
Palaniswami (EPS) would eventually take power, but only after a protracted succession battle
with long-time Jayalalithaa deputy O. Paneerselvam (OPS), who became Chief Minister upon
Jayalalithaa’s death. EPS managed to take power only by making OPS his Deputy Chief Minister
in a power-sharing agreement in 2017, but the two factions would still be at cross-purposes.105
Under Palaniswami’s leadership, the AIADMK has taken a different tack towards the BJP and
Modi than Jayalalithaa ever did, joining the NDA in 2019, though discussions about joining the
government began in 2017. The strategy was multifold. It would cement Palaniswami’s
leadership of the AIADMK by sidelining anti-BJP elements within his party, it would ensure
more regional influence for Tamil Nadu in government, and it would link the party with a proven
vote-getter.106 With the death of Jayalalithaa and his own fragile political base, it thus made sense
he would track a new path for the party by, ideally, giving it further electoral strength after the
death of its long-time and iconic leader. Further, as a political entrepreneur, it would expand the
party’s voter base to the type of Hindu nationalist supporters who were placated by Jayalalithaa
throughout her tenure but who might turn off the AIADMK in future elections. Whether or not
this dual strategy, of entrenching his coalition while expanding it outside the Dravidian tradition
that was historically hostile to BJP hindu nationalism, would be successful would be tested in the
2019 general election in the state, which was tied with multiple by-elections for control of the
legislative assembly.
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India’s 2019 election would be a decisive defeat for the AIADMK. The DMK won 38 out
of 39 Federal seats, up from 0 from 2014, and 13 out of 24 by-election seats, gaining 10 seats.107
The decisive victory did not remove Palaniswami from power, but it did serve as a great shock to
the party that had dominated the 2010s. The election served as a dry run for the 2021 election,
with MK Stalin focusing tightly on the state’s Dravidian identity, rural unrest, and relentless
anger at Modi, helped by his united coalition of the INC and the Communist parties.108 Further,
Modi’s unique unpopularity in the state provided key electoral support in this general election,
strengthening Stalin’s electoral appeal.109 The 2021 election would thus be a test to see whether
or not these issues would have salience in a state-wide, and not a Federal, context.
For Tamil Nadu, the April 2021 election was again a clear referendum on Modi. MK
Stalin himself, a political entrepreneur as effective as his father, linked the AIADMK tightly to
the BJP, saying in one interview that, People have understood that even if AIADMK gets a
single-seat this time, their MLA will function as a BJP MLA.” and that the, “BJP wants to break
AIADMK and establish their foot in this land” with a government led by the DMK able to fight,
“against the BJP and not allow it into the state”.110 Though it was not a straight DMK-BJP fight,
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to the voters MK Stalin was portraying it just as that and, for all intents and purposes, it became
that given how Federalized the election became. MK Stalin, as a rational political entrepreneur,
was able to move the election away from a fight just about the AIADMK’s legacy in government
from 2011-2021, but, because of its alliance with the BJP, make the entire election about the BJP,
as if the BJP had been ruling the state for the past 10 years. He played on his state’s almost
exceptionally strong regionalist identity and social-justice focused Dravidian tradition to oppose
the BJP and use his party’s tighter organization, which he himself had reformed, to even more
effectively convey this central message. His coalition allies, namely the Indian National
Congress, attempted to capitalize on these same themes, as Rahul Gandhi gave a large rally
across Tamil Nadu in January 2021 to highlight many of the same themes as the DMK,
highlighting Tamil pride, but focused mostly on the BJP’s overall economic policy and policies
against China.111 Rahul Gandhi himself was much more popular than Modi in Tamil Nadu, which
made the INC in Tamil Nadu have the most competent and coherent campaign out of the cases
discussed.112 By comparison, the DMK acted on more salient Tamil anger against the BJP and
AIADMK, namely intense rural anger that had developed since 2016.
Part of the reason the BJP was so unpopular in Tamil Nadu was the BJP’s
perceived failure to alleviate rural Tamils' distress. The state had experienced a 41% rain deficit
compared to its usual monsoon rains in 2017, with 32 districts being declared drought, and 21 of
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those severely in drought. A Supreme Court case over water access with Karnataka ended in
Tamil Nadu’s favor in 2018, but that failed to alleviate the crisis. Farmers began going to Delhi
to protest the lack of adequate Federal support, and were ignored by the government. They then
engaged in bizarre protests like holding rats in their mouths, displaying the skulls of farmers who
had decided to take their own lives due to the crisis, and drinking urine. Palaniswami went out
and spoke to the farmers eventually,113 but the damage was done to the BJP’s perception in the
state. Further, the BJP had banned beef slaughter in 2017,114 after a Supreme Court case had
banned Jallikattu, a traditional Tamil bull-taming competition as part of Pongal competitions, in
2014. The winners of the competition would be given money and prizes, and even if the bull won
a competition the owner would win prizes for themself for raising a bull unable to be felled, plus
fetching huge prizes for the owner in cattle fairs. Thus, the combined decisions wiped out a key
part of Tamil farmer’s incomes, and a point of huge Tamil pride, right when the state was facing
an agricultural crisis and farmers were desperately needing cash. Further, the introduction of
cross-bred species of cow, while increasing milk yields, had displaced existing species of Tamil
cows, those most prized for Jallikattu.
Protests would soon break out starting January 8th 2017 to defend Jallikattu, right at the
time when Jayalalithaa had died and Karunanidhi was severely ailing, thus becoming a largely
leaderless protest movement. Without leadership, the protests became intensely Tamil nationalist
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and regionalist, playing on the deep anger of central government dominance.115 The Tamil
Assembly passed a law unanimously legalizing Jalikattu on January 23rd 2017,116 but the antiBJP feelings were already triggered and ripe for reaping. Beyond these Tamil-specific protests,
Tamil Nadu farmers also joined anti-Farm Amendment protests,117 with almost 3,000 charged for
the protests, and another almost 6,000 charged for protesting various AIADMK development
projects that had elicited local opposition.118 Responding to this, MK Stalin did not let the
opportunity to play on rural anger go to pass, and he launched his own “going to the village”
outreach scheme in 2019 upon taking power of the DMK in order to hear rural grievances.119
Thus, MK Stalin was very well-prepared to capitalize off rural anger and exploit this
groundswell of anger for electoral benefit, combining a Dravidian political tradition to the
specifics of the situation like the most seasoned political entrepreneur.
The results of the 2021 election would vindicate MK Stalin’s strategy. The DMK would
win 134 out of 234 seats, a rise of 44, with their allies, including the INC and Communists,
gaining 18 more, for a total of 159 seats. The DMK managed a single-party majority for the
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party, the first time in 25 years the party had done so. The AIADMK lost 70 seats, though the
BJP managed to win, for the first time in a Tamil state election, 4 seats. A combination of
regional identity, political entrepreneurship, and rural anger had given the DMK one of its bestever performances. Thus, for Tamil Nadu the specific combination of its history provided a key
defeat for the BJP and its ally the AIADMK, and it makes sense as to why. Tamil Nadu had an
existing political elite in the DMK well versed in an alternate identity and political tradition that
could mobilize an extremely emotional identity, Tamilness, while also exploiting the
government’s, both state and federal, weakness on rural policy. MK Stalin provided the lead by
organizing a broad electoral coalition to polarize the results and acting as a political entrepreneur
to mobilize voters using the longstanding style and tactics of the Dravidian tradition his father
had helped popularize. Thus, the state stands as a clear example of the BJP failing to have an
electoral breakthrough and finding itself electorally toxic, weakening the very political allies it
had hoped to use to create a bridgehead. For the AIADMK, it found itself in a bind between
aligning with a toxic BJP or going its own way and losing its influence in the central
government, and potentially antagonizing the most powerful politician in India. It was a lose-lose
situation that could have been worse, but still highlights the complexity of Indian politics in the
BJP’s quest to have a genuine electoral breakthrough in states it lacks a history in. The
ideological tradition of Tamil political entrepreneurship thus provided an effective countermobilization to BJP attempts to have an electoral breakthrough.
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West Bengal
Background to 1977
West Bengal is unique among the rest of the cases discussed in that the state was a
Communist Party of India (Marxist) stronghold from 1977-2011, and so was ruled by a different
sort of party than the INC, ex-INC, or regional party dynamics discussed in the other cases. The
Communist Party of India itself was founded in 1925 in Bengal,120 and remained a prominent
political force in opposition to British colonialism and in, at times, alliance with the Indian
National Congress for the rest of the 1920s, 30s, and 40s. Upon independence, the party was one
of the few truly national parties in India, and had an uneasy relationship to the INC, on the one
hand supportive of it as a “progressive element” but also seeing it as a capitalist party that was
not amicable to CPI interests. These tensions, with the revolutionary communist ideology of the
CPI coming into conflict with collaborationist policies of the CPI leadership when it came to the
INC,121 and ongoing tension related to the Sino-Soviet split,122 meant that the party would
eventually break apart in 1964.123 The CPI was the section of the party in favor of collaborating
with the INC, with the CPI(M) being associated with the left-wing of the party who were most
opposed to the INC. They faced an Indian National Congress branch in West Bengal that had
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ruled the state since independence, but one that was much weaker than its dominance would
suggest.
The INC had faced several splits themselves, with key figures leaving in 1950 to join
what eventually became the Praja Socialist Party, and in 1966 with the Bangla Congress led by
Ajoy Kumar Mukherjee. This defection, and ensuing alliance with the CPI(M) in a United Front
against the INC, meant they were ready to exploit the Food Movement of 1966, as the state, after
Partition ensured that millions of Hindu refugees from East Pakistan flooded into the state, had
deep problems with food production. The rural aspect of this movement, not just isolated to
Kolkata but agrarian districts of the state, ensured that there was intense anger at the incumbent
INC government amid a wider kerosene shortage.124 This culminated in the 1967 election, in
which Bangla Congress leaders aligned with the CPI(M) to exploit this crisis to build their own
support among rural and urban Bengalis. Their alliance, called the United Front, would form a
government after the INC lost their majority, and the government, of which the CPI(M) was the
largest single party, only lasted around 8 months before President’s Rule was imposed. The state
government was dismissed and the state became ruled by the Central Government, until new
elections.125 Even this early on in the state, the CPI(M) began to show itself, uniquely in India
besides in Kerala, as a potent electoral force willing and capable of exploiting popular anger
against the INC, especially in rural and urban areas.
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The CPI(M) soon faced challenges in West Bengal, however. The left-wing of the party
soon split because they felt the party was not pursuing an armed revolution, with this faction
being influenced by Maoism. The movement, led by Charu Mazumdar, began armed attacks in
1967 in the north of West Bengal, in the area of Naxalbari, which is how the Naxalite rebellion
got its name, as the Maoist insurgency in this region has remained ever since.126 The 1969
elections saw a repeat of the victory for the United Front coalition once again, with the coalition
winning 214 seats to the INC’s 55.127 A Kerala-esque alternating of power between a
Communist-dominated socialist front and a INC-front did not develop however, as the coalition
soon broke down by the 1971 election, with the CPI(M) running against a CPI alliance and a
reformed and energized INC under Indira Gandhi’s leadership. The Bangla Congress joined the
INC in government, and soon rejoined the party, but President's Rule was soon reimposed again
due to the state’s instability. Further, after India’s decisive victory against Pakistan in the 1971
War, the party won a reclaimed majority in alliance with the CPI.128 Thus, by 1972, the CPI(M)
found itself out of power and with its enemies united, at the nadir of its desire to rule the state.
This would not last long in the rapidly shifting politics of West Bengal.
In 1977, the CPI(M) formed an electoral coalition with the other Communist and left
parties to dislodge the INC government, but it would not be a two-ring competition. The Janata
Party ran in the state as well, though as part of their own bloc as the CPI(M) and the Janata had
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originally negotiated for a common front, but the negotiations fell through. The CPI(M) became
the main beneficiary of the public anger against Indira Gandhi’s Emergency, though the scale of
their victory surprised even them, as the party had negotiated with the Janata to have 52% of the
seats in their arrangement.129 Their coalition won 231 seats out of 294, with the CPI(M) as the
dominant party having 174 out of 231, becoming the single largest party in West Bengal. It was
not a fluke, as the party then won an increased majority in 1982. The Communists were in charge
in West Bengal, and they would go on to govern from 1977 to 2011, an unprecedented period of
stability for a non-Congress party in India.
West Bengal under the Left Front and the TMNC
Now in government, the CPI(M) took the state in a unique direction compared to most
states in India. Importantly, the party actively downplayed religion, discouraging it officially.130
This, combined with the CPI(M)’s downplaying of caste as an important social fault-line,
ensured that party affiliation, not communal ties, dominated state’s politics as the CPI(M)
entrenched itself in power and used party patronage networks to create an electoral machine for
itself. There were clear reasons for this downplaying of caste and religion in the state, not just
because of the ideology of the ruling party. The state has always had a fractured caste and
communal outlook, varying ethnically and linguistically from the Bihari-dominated east to the
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tribal interior and Gurkha-dominated Darjeeling district.131 More importantly, no single caste
makes up a significant land-holding class compared to a caste like the Yadavs or Jats in Uttar
Pradesh, which in those states created political incentives for political entrepreneurs to form the
community into a coherent and electorally potent group. The caste makeup of the whole state is
highly localized, with some castes dominating a district or two, but nothing at all on the scale of
more regional caste identities seen in other states.132 The CPI(M) did engage in tactical caste
mobilization through candidate selection at the local level, but the state did not develop a
backward caste movement, or a dominant caste movement, as seen in Maharashtra or Tamil
Nadu.133 This reality even impacted landholding classes, with large landholders being from
diverse castes and thus not able to be unified into a single, unified electoral movement.134
Demands for land reform thus did not take a caste dimension, but a class dimension, which
greatly facilitated the mobilization of the landless against large landowners by the Communists
along class lines.
The results of the Communist land policy further cemented this fractured caste makeup.
Landholding by the end of the CPI(M)’s tenure was roughly equal across castes. In 2011, 46.5%
of households do not own land other than their homesteads, compared to the 54.1% of Dalits
households who are landless, and further, 82.18% of holding, across all holdings in the state, are
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marginal, compared to 86.6% for Scheduled Caste holdings.135 Uniquely in India, West Bengal
breaks up easy lines of caste mobilization, which in part explains why the CPI(M) was able to
dominate the state by mobilizing party affiliation and not other identities.
Party society became the watchword of the CPI(M)’s governance in West Bengal, which
involved the almost total dominance of the public sphere by the party. Party became “an
intermediary between the government and the communities” that jealously guarded its ability to
remain in power, which also explains in part the high levels of political violence that affects the
state.136 The early successes of the CPI(M) in land reform were down to this total politicization
of the society, with land activists going across the state at the grass-roots to ensure land reform
was achieved and spreading its message. As time wore on, the ideological comrades going to the
villages were replaced by a more professional cadre of loyalists, from solvent farmers, to local
club owners, to the salaried and moneyed classes more generally.137 Left Front dominance was
achieved at the local level through control at the village level, which eventually became a system
of clientelist alleviation of political concerns through continued electoral support,138 which in
part also explains how the Left Front was able to govern the state until 2011. This mobilization
of the party’s traditional middle-class rural and urban base made the party give up its more
radical linkages with the mass populace, even as it entrenched itself to become a party of
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government and not ideology.139 Elite capture weakened control of the party and took it away
from its rural base, which ensured the party stagnated as a party of government and eventually
was unable to continue to provide the goods and services that its clientelist networks needed.140
Political entrepreneurs, long sidelined, were thus able to mobilize support for these disaffected
groups and mobilize them into a coherent movement. The political entrepreneur most associated
with this new era was Mamata Banerjee.
It’s worth mentioning Banerjee’s early origins because it’s both essential to her own
political story, and also explains in part her style as a political entrepreneur. Mamata Banerjee
was born to a lower-middle class family in South Kolkata, but the family fell into poverty upon
the death of her father when she was quite young. She carried on with her education, however,
and early on became an activist in the INC’s student wing in the mid-1970s. She earned fame in
the 1980s by defeating the CPI(M) heavyweight Somnath Chatterjee in a safe Communist seat in
Kolkata, quickly shooting to prominence as a wonder-girl for the party. She throughout the 80s
fought against the Left Front’s industrial policies, and adopted numerous populist positions,
earning a reputation as an ebullient personality but frequently butting heads against the long-time
powerbrokers in the INC. Her tenure as a Cabinet Minister under PM Rao from 1991-1993 was
quickly cut short when she abruptly resigned as she felt the Government was not doing enough to
resolve “atrocities'' in West Bengal. Throughout the 1990s she soured on the INC for, in her
mind, a lack of commitment to defeat the CPI(M), as she was willing to form any and all
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alliances to defeat the party, even with the BJP. She would eventually leave the Congress on
December 17th, 1997, over her lingering battle over control of state party, culminating in a battle
over candidate lists which brought in Sonia Gandhi and the top leadership to try and resolve the
crisis.141 After leaving the party, she held a mega-rally on December 29th, 1997 to found her new
political organ, the Trinamool Congress. Thus, Banerjee has had to work her way up in Bengal
politics and create her own electoral niche without an institutional party to support her, unlike
Sharad Pawar, Uddhav Thackeray, and MK Stalin, all of whom had very established parties and
movements to fall back on.
She developed a reputation as unpredictable throughout the 2000s.142 She first made an
“agreement” with the BJP for the 1998 election, but quickly said she would not join any BJP
cabinet but support from the outside if it followed policy programs. Within the year she then
joined as Railway Minister under PM Vajpayee in 1999, but left it in 2001 over a corruption
scandal in the Ministry of Defense. She then joined her party with the INC for the 2001 West
Bengal election. The Congress alliance, though Banerjee’s party immediately became the second
largest party, actually lost seats compared to the unified Congress in 1996, and the TMNC did
worse than in assembly by-elections in 1998. She then rejoined the NDA and would become
Minister of Coal for a short period in 2004.143 The reason for this dizzying array of coalition
marks her as a more obvious version of political entrepreneur than what the other cases highlight.
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Mamata had to create her own niche that built on her time in the INC, but still had to do that
while still trying to overthrow the CPI(M), but could not find the right combination of issues and
alliances beyond her own personal appeal. She ran into the same problems the INC had had
against the Left Front, namely that the rural party machine the CPI(M) had created was hugely
difficult to displace by the more individual focused electoral organ of the Congress party.144 Her
appeal at this stage mostly rested on her personality, which while extremely potent in building an
electoral coalition among the Kolkata slums, the rural poor, and anti-communists,145 lacked the
organizational capacity to sustain its victory or build outward. The only way to defeat the party
state would be to take over the party state themselves, and to find some cleavage to exploit to
build her own durable political base. She would solve both problems as the 2000s drew on.
As time wore on, Banerjee built up her party infrastructure to replace the Communists in
control of the organs of the party state. She especially mobilized against Communist public
domain policy, which took land away from farmers to build industrial projects, specifically two
projects, a car factory at Sanjur and a chemical plant at Nandigram.146 The anger at the special
economic zone being created around Nandigram culminated in 2006-2007 with local villagers
being massacred by police during one protest,147 which allowed Banerjee and the TMC to
mobilize public outrage against the CPI(M). Banerjee, as a rational political entrepreneur finding
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her niche, mobilized massively off the emotive dispute, with Banerjee herself going on hunger
strike to protest the land acquisition. This paid immediate political dividends, with the party and
its allies winning 26 out of 42 seats in the 2009 general election. In the 2011 regional election,
for the first time since 1977, the CPI(M) and its allies were swept from power, and Mamata
Banerjee and the TMC took power.148
West Bengal Through the 2021 Election
Unlike the other cases discussed, in West Bengal the BJP nor any of its regional allies
have been in power in the state. Once in power, Mamata Banerjee and the TMC have remained
in power. Upon winning in 2011, the party managed to win reelection in 2016 for a variety of
factors. Her government implemented several popular welfare schemes aimed at key
constituencies, from a financial aid scheme to keep girls in school and avoid marriage, to direct
food aid for almost 80% of the population.149 The TMC platform further focused on affordable
housing construction, infrastructure development, and doubling health expenditures,150 on top of
government improvements, namely higher revenue collection and improvements to civic
services, though her government was tainted by several corruption scandals.151 The result of

148PTI.

“Assembly Election 2011 West Bengal: Trinamool Congress Rises like Phoenix.” The Economic Times, Last
Modified May 13, 2011. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/assembly-election-2011west-bengal-trinamool-congress-rises-like-phoenix/articleshow/8293363.cms.
149Ghosal,

Sutanuka. “How Trinamool Congress Hopes to Use Mamata Government's Welfare Programmes to
Return to Power in West Bengal.” The Economic Times, Last Modified May 5, 2016. https://
economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/how-trinamool-congress-hopes-to-use-mamatagovernments-welfare-programmes-to-return-to-power-in-west-bengal/articleshow/51263275.cms?from=mdr.
150Vasudha Venugopal,“TMC

Manifesto Promises Basic Income, Sops for Women, Farmers, Students.” The
Economic Times, Last Modified March 18, 2021. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/elections/assemblyelections/west-bengal/tmc-promises-basic-income-to-women-10-lakh-msmes/articleshow/81556321.cms?from=mdr.
151Maitreesh

Ghatak,“Mamata Hasn't Delivered Much for Bengal – Take a Look.” South Asia@LSE, Last Modified
May 17, 2016. https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/southasia/2016/04/21/mamata-hasnt-delivered-much-for-bengal-take-a-look/.

Markel 72

these policies, on top of her own dominant political personality, meant that the TMC cruised to
re-election in 2016 bringing them to 211 out of 294 seats and 44.91% of the vote.152 On top of
the TMC’s victory, the opposition parties fared poorly, with the INC becoming the largest party
but the Left Front sliding even further, losing 10% of their vote to 19.75%, in part because poor
voters had gone over to the TMC.153 However, the BJP, which had never really had a presence in
the state before 2011, rose 6 points to a not too distant fourth place. Banerjee was crafting a
broad electoral constituency by using universalist programs to broaden her base, and then
entrench it through use of the party state. The nature of the party state was changing though,
partly due to Banerjee’s own political entrepreneurship but also due to the collapse of the
hegemonic CPI(M) and what it meant for the BJP.
Without the ideological suppression of communal identities by the Left Front, West
Bengal has seen a resurgence of local identities since 2011. Communal violence, long marginal
in the state compared to political violence, has slowly increased, especially since 2017 with
overtly political and violent celebrations of Ram Navami and Hanuman Jayanti in the state.154
Hindu nationalism had been historically weak in the state, where, even though the Rana Singh
party tried to mobilize Hindu refugees in the state in the 1940s and 50s, they found themselves
an extremely marginal political force. The BJP did get a small foothold, but the mobilization of
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refugees by the Communists, and explicit downplaying of caste and religion by the Left Front
once it took power,155 meant the party faced decades of marginal influence. The Left Front, in
creating a hegemony ideology outside the normal bounds of Indian politics, namely caste,
regional identity, and religion, helped cement the bhadralok civil society tradition in the state,
with its famous rationalism, liberalism, and secularism and most associated with the
intelligentsia of Calcutta. Once that disappeared, and with the rise of social media outside the
traditional elite opinion formation spheres, it allowed the BJP and Hindu nationalism to
proliferate throughout the state.156 Thus, the BJP has massively exploited the gap the fall of the
Left Front has provided to mobilize identity and build political coalitions that previously had not
existed in the state, which would massively impact the 2021 election in the state.
Counter-mobilization by the Muslim population of the state has also occurred, as in 2016
51% of Muslims in the state voted for the TMC, with the amount voting for the Left Front going
from 42% in 2011 to 24% in 2016.157 With this rise of Hindu nationalist discourse, Mamata
Banerjee and her government have mobilized cultural nationalism to mobilize another vector of
identity to mobilize their voter base against the BJP. Bengali identity and regional identity have
always expressed themselves in Banjeree’s politics, both as political entrepreneurship to create
her own unique political brand but also as a genuine cultural identity.158 This mobilization thus
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creates an authentic personal appeal for the TMC and Banerjee as purporting to be the authentic
voice of the Bengali people against supposed BJP dominance, giving her a rhetorical and
ideological tool against the BJP. Though, even as religious and regional identity have expanded
since 2011, caste identity has not been activated. Party identity is still the dominant form of
mobilization in the state, with the TMNC replacing the CPI(M) as the dominant party in local
institutions. Because the party society is still extremely potent, political violence has remained
uniquely prolific in the state.159 For the 2021 election, the stage was set for these trends to fully
come into play.
For the 2021 election, unlike in Tamil Nadu and Maharashtra, the BJP wanted to take
power in the state and unseat their fierce rival. The BJP explicitly played on Hindu nationalism,
corruption scandals within the TMC government, and focused on non-Bengali speaking migrant
workers predominantly in Kolkata,160 with Modi heavily campaigning in the state. Though Modi
was forced to halt campaigning due to the Covid-19 pandemic ravaging India towards the last of
the final election stages,161 he still held 23 rallies in the state, while Amit Shah, Modi’s righthand man and Union Home Minister, held 79.162 Mamata Banerjee, however, built off her prior
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policies to hold on to power. While rural policy was not at the heart of the election, unlike
Maharashtra or Tamil Nadu, this is not to say rural West Bengal was not suffering.
Various farmer groups voiced complaints about poor irrigation and price supports, and
the state has lagged behind on GDP growth compared to urban areas.163 The state has also faced
severe rainfall deficits, which hit 49% in 2019. The TMC government alleviated some concerns
with a crop insurance program and a cash program for farmers in 2019, but enrollment was slow
and crop prices remained low in the state.164 However, the broad linkage of the poor in rural and
urban areas since the Left Front dominance seems to have made rural issues a less salient issue,
especially due to the welfare schemes introduced by the government since 2011.165 This was in
spite of the BJP doing well in rural areas in 2019, when it came within 3% of displacing the
TMNC, and also lukewarm reaction to the farm bills,166 with mostly political strikes against it
but without a mass outbreak of protests.167 Mamata’s campaign focused heavily on her
government’s programs in the first phase of the campaign, and the party won 52% of poor
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women, 55% of lower class women, and beat the BJP among Adivasi women by close to 10%.168
The party’s traditional base in Kolkata and other urban areas further helped the TMNC,169 with it
winning all 93 out of 108 seats in the Presidency division, which includes Kolkata, a decrease of
only 2 seats from 2016. Further, the BJP’s focus on Hindu nationalism caused a countermobilization by Muslim voters, who went even stronger for the TMC than they did in 2016.170 In
the majority Muslim, and highly rural, electoral district of Murshidabad, the TMNC won 20 out
of 22 seats. All of this meant that even as the TMNC had a rural weakness compared to the other
cases, the specifics of West Bengal allowed Banerjee to still perform well and outperform the
BJP.
Beyond the fundamentals of the race, the party organization and personal gravitas of
Banerjee helped push the party over the edge, and score a decisive victory by even gaining the
vote share by 3.11% and gaining 4 seats, even as the BJP gained 27.81% to 37.97% and gained
74 seats to 77. Mamata Banerjee had managed to remain in power and hand the BJP one of its
clearest failures, a rare feat. She had achieved this victory, and achieved her dominance in
Bengali politics, due to her political entrepreneurship. As time wore on, she has proven highly
adept at mobilizing political issues and identities to remain in power, from anti-Communism
early in her career, to vehement opposition to Left Front land policy in the 2000s, to Bengali
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nationalism throughout her tenure in office in the 2010s. Further, her takeover of the Left Front
party state and welfare programs have both cemented her voter base and alleviated their material
concerns, which has guaranteed her staying in power. Thus, another model of political
entrepreneurship in the era of Modi is incumbent Chief Ministers opposed to Modi utilizing
universalist programs to expand their political base. On top of that, the state provides a clear sign
of the potency of regionalist identities to displace the hegemony of the BJP’s appeal to Hindu
identity. Banerjee is in many ways the most stellar political entrepreneur of the cases, as she has
had to develop her own party organization from its charismatic beginning, to institutionalization,
to now hegemony in the state. In her, it highlights the paths Indian political entrepreneurs have
available to themselves in building a lasting coalition and the multiple paths to power they have,
and also the opportunities they face once in power to use the benefits of incumbency for their
own ends.

Markel 78

Conclusion
As seen throughout the cases, resistance to Modi and the BJP government at the state
level has played on several key themes. State political entrepreneurs have shown greater
flexibility, competence, and dynamism in opposing the BJP, and have been able to play to the
BJP’s weaknesses in state elections from 2019-2021. The three different models of winning
against the BJP, in Maharashtra uniting state parties in alliance against an incumbent BJP Chief
Minister, in Tamil Nadu ousting the BJP and its ally based on a united front of anti-BJP parties,
and in West Bengal where an incumbent state party Chief Minister used the benefits of her
incumbency to maintain power against a rising BJP. Each case, while distinct, highlights the
same points: dynamic state political entrepreneurs being able to defeat the BJP through uniting
together disparate state parties and through the use of electoral cleavages, in each case most
notably regional identities and rural distress. The cases elaborated on these points, but they do
have an exception to broader applicability in Indian politics, as noted in the recent state election
in Uttar Pradesh in March 2022.
In this case, Uttar Pradesh highlights several of the key points outlined in other cases, but
the trends were not enough to ensure an opposition victory. The Samajwadi Party under Akhilesh
Yadav had an energetic, rural-focused campaign to try and unseat the popular incumbent
government of Yogi Adiyanath.171 He was able to form alliances with the RLD party representing
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Yadavs mostly in Western UP,172 and other smaller parties to show a surprisingly united front to
the BJP.173 Though his alliance gained 71 seats overall and the SP had its best ever state-level
result, the BJP and their allies retained their majority. The reasons behind this failure of the
opposition highlight the limitations of this study. First, there was a significant third party in Uttar
Pradesh that did exist in other cases, namely the BSP party under Mayawati. The party ran in all
403 seats in Uttar Pradesh, but garnered almost 13% of the vote and lost all but one of their seats,
their worst ever result. Thus, the BSP acted as a spoiler and divided what, in other cases, has
been a united opposition to the BJP, as in Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu, and West Bengal parties
outside of the main opposition alliance (NCP-INC in Maharashtra, the Secular Progressive
Alliance in Tamil Nadu, and the TMC+ in West Bengal) only garnered around 6-8% of the vote.
The BSP thus acted as a significant limitation on the chances for opposition victory. Further, the
state lacked a unique regional identity or linguistic tradition compared to the other cases, which
limited the identities the SP could mobilize compared to Tamil nationalism for the DMK,
Marathi identity for the NCP, and Bengali regionalism for the TMC. Along with this, the BJP
was the dominant political player in Uttar Pradesh and has been ruling the state since 2017, and
lacked in-state allies as seen in Tamil Nadu or Maharashtra. West Bengal has seen the BJP
catapult to second place in recent years, but the party still lacks the history of governance the
BJP in Uttar Pradesh has. Though the BJP government still had problems with rural constituents,
the party was thus able to hold their coalition together enough to remain in power. Thus, even as
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the UP case highlights a model of anti-BJP campaigning by state-level political entrepreneurs, it
also highlights the limitation of this model without regional identity and nationalism creating that
other level of identity to decrease the potency of BJP hindu and caste mobilization.
What this means for the future of Indian politics is unclear. The cases discussed do show
that even as the BJP is hegemonic at the Federal level, at the state level the party faces a much
more challenging path to one day achieving power across every Indian state. The BJP is not
unassailable, and in the right circumstances can be decisively defeated or sidelined politically.
For the 2024 Indian general Election, this has mixed outcomes for any opposition strategy. This
study has highlighted the benefits of a united, polarized campaign against the BJP and playing on
rural distress and regional nationalism, but also the limits of state political entrepreneurs. While
parties like the DMK, NCP, and TMNC successfully deal with the BJP, expanding their
campaigns outside their home states will be hugely difficult, as it would be odd to campaign with
Dravidian Tamil nationalism in a state like Haryana, just as it’d be odd to have a full-throated
defense of the Bangla language in Telangana. This means that the INC, for all its poor decisionmaking in the cases outlined, remains the sole party with the national organization to campaign
across India, and the INC can learn much from these state cases. Focusing on rural issues, and
showing greater discipline with campaigns in forming coalitions with state parties in states where
the party is weak, is the party’s main hope for continued relevance. The systemic leadership
failures the party has seen from the Gandhi dynasty since 2014 also strongly suggests the need
for deep reforms to the party leadership to better capitalize off BJP weakness. The possibility
does exist of another path, in a coalition of state parties forming together and attempting to win
an electoral majority, as seen in the United Front governments from 1996-1998. This would
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capitalize off the advantages state parties have against the BJP as discussed in this study, but
whether or not these fractious parties united only in opposition to the BJP, and with limited
electoral pull outside their home states, can truly win against Modi in a possible 2024 matchup is
difficult to say.
Regardless of this paper’s findings, Indian politics still revolve around the unique
electoral power of Narendra Modi, though the nature of the Federal system in India means he can
still face significant electoral defeats. Whether the 71 year old Modi will want to campaign for
another general election in 2024, or allow himself or his party to choose a successor, will be
hugely significant to future Indian politics. At this point in 2012, 3 years after the INC managed
to win another term in office, it appeared unthinkable that the BJP would be in this position of
hegemony just 10 years later. Whether the INC and state opposition parties can repeat this upset
will depend on the specific leadership of the INC and state parties and who they run to replace
Modi. What is certain is that, for as moribund the INC is, the state of the opposition in India is
not totally hopeless. State political entrepreneurs highlight the vibrancy and potency of an antiBJP alternative in Indian politics, much more so than the INC does in its current state. Whether
state victories can translate to Federal Indian politics, or if India will remain for the foreseeable
future dominated by the BJP, is for the future to decide. Only time will tell where India goes
from here.
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